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The crisis in Lebanon involves both an internal
political upheaval and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict
over the armed Palestinian presence in the south. The three
periods of civil war, interspersed with often violated
ceasefires and sporadic violence, have left much of the
country physically and socio-economically devastated. How-
ever, little has been resolved, and civil war could reignite
at little provocation. The government faces a growing
legitimacy crisis and the steps toward a political solution
have not yet as much as begun. Armed militias of the internal
factions, Palestinian commando units and outside military
forces rule the country. Meanwhile, clashes between Lebanese,
Palestinian and Israeli units continue to make the south a
fortified battlefield. The longer this impasse remains, the
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people accept government only if the government
accepts its first duty - which is to protect them.
Whether in a feudal, modern, imperial or municipal
society, people choose government over nongovernment
chiefly to protect themselves from dangers they cannot
cope with as individuals or families.
from In Search of History by Theodore H. White
The recent history of Lebanon has been a generally
troubled and all too frequently violent one. In two periods
of civil war fighting (1975-1976 and 1978) interspersed with
often violated ceasefires and truces tens of thousands of
Lebanese and Palestinians have lost their lives. Tens of
thousands of others have seen their villages and homes turned
into battlefields or destroyed and were thus forced to join
the ever growing number of dispossessed refugees with which
the country is becoming overburdened. More recently, south
Lebanon has also become a battlefront as Israel continues
its policy of striking against Palestinian positions in this
regionally disputed area. The inability of the Lebanese
state to counteract or prevent these Israeli incursions on
to its supposed sovereign territory and to exert its authority
in the south brings into question the continued viability of
the state itself. For although Mr. White's statement above
was written describing China in the 1930s it holds no less
true for Lebanon today.
It is at first difficult to understand or explain the
reasons for what has come to be referred to as the Lebanese
Crisis. In simple terms, particularly during the civil war

fighting, the crisis has been characterized as either re-
ligious sectarian strife (Christian versus Moslem) or
ideological opposition (left versus right) or a combination
of the two. Yet, on closer examination these factors are
not only misleading but also constitute only part of Lebanon's
problems. Underlying social and economic upheavals have been
present in the state system since inception, and these up-
heavals also play their part in providing cause for the inter-
necine fighting. Power struggles among the various clan-
oriented political/military factions in the country are a
cause of tension and violence as well. Traditionally, how-
ever, once civil war scale violence has erupted in the
country - initially only involving several of the groups or
militias - even ideologically divergent groups have tended
to coalesce into opposing Christian/rightist and Moslem/
leftist alliances, thus giving this commonly held sectarian
characterization to the civil war fighting. Finally, ex-
ternal actors such as the Palestinian militias and more
recently Syria and Israel have given a broader regional con-
text to the fighting. The Palestinian militias in south
Lebanon which in a sense are carrying on the Arab struggle
against Israel have been involved in Lebanon's civil war
disputes as well. The Arab versus Israeli aspect of this
widening of the original civil war makes the Lebanese Crisis
a definite threat to Middle East peace - and particularly
to the success of the U.S. sponsored Camp David initiatives.

The fact that Lebanon at least constitutionally repre-
sents one of the few remaining democratic governments in
the Middle East region makes its possible future demise
that much more noteworthy from a Western perspective. The
laisez faire Western type economy of the country along with
the entrepreneurial skill of its citizens has made Beirut,
Lebanon's capital, the financial capital of the Middle East.
This democratic tradition and the strong Westernized economy
are both threatened by the turmoil in the country. At times
it seems as if the opposing internal factions (along with
their external backers) are determined to either destroy
and eliminate their rivals completely, or failing that, to
effectively destroy the Lebanese state as it exists today.
The cultural pluralism of the Christian and Moslem Lebanese
is ancient and deep-seated and is only exacerbated by the
sectarian civil war fighting. The hopes of reconciling
differences between the two groups fade as animosities are
perpetuated by acts of violence inflicted by one on the
other in an escalating spiral which carries on from one
generation to the next. Amidst this situation the Lebanese
government has been relegated to little more than a media-
tory body, its ability to exert its authority severely
limited by the sectarian division in the country and the
weakness of its army. In one respect, it could be said
that the inherent slow response of a democratic system of
government to social unrest plus the overwhelming influences
of outside forces have made it difficult for both Christian

and Muslim Lebanese to identify with and support their
government - giving Lebanon a legitimacy crisis in addition
to or as a result of its other problems.
Lebanon's present political impasse is attributable
to several distinct yet interrelated factors over and above
the domestic civil war sectarian issues which are themselves
as yet unresolved. The Palestinian presence, the ineffec-
tiveness of the Lebanese military and the situation in south
Lebanon are all combining to create a regional crisis with
international implications. A solution to the Lebanese
Crisis has thus been linked to the implementation of an
overall Middle East peace program. Although some would
argue that the conflict societies of the Middle East make
the establishment of political stability and associated
peace in the region difficult or impossible, it seems clear
at this point that only the intercession of an outside
actor with no direct stake in the crisis in a mediatory
role may make a solution to the impasse possible. And it is
becoming increasingly more apparent that the only nation
both willing and able to provide this mediatory role is the
United States, since the Arab League has refused to make a
firm commitment to support the Lebanese state. Therefore,
the need for U.S. policymakers to attempt to understand all
the factors involved in the Lebanese Crisis becomes more
urgent. The Camp David peace initiatives, the U.S. -Israeli
relationship and the U.S .-Palestinian dialogue are all
critical variables which will no doubt evolve and change as

events in the area progress. The fate of Lebanon, much to
its dismay, is critically linked to the manner in which the
issues these variables impact upon are resolved. Unfortun-
ately, Lebanon itself has little or no control over the
resolution of these issues on which its fate depends.
The thesis to be examined in the following discourse
is that (contrary to the common Christian/rightist versus
Moslem/leftist characteristic given to explain the continued
Lebanese Crisis) the nature of the conflict is essentially
that of political and economic determinism - essentially
that of rival political elements supported by opposing ex-
ternal actors each with its own stake in the resolution of
the crisis. The factors to be examined will be: 1) the
historical background leading to Lebanon's current plight
including the evolution of the Lebanese political system,
2) the legitimacy crisis and its resulting social unrest,
3) the actors and factions operating on Lebanon's domestic
scene, 4) the external actors active in Lebanese affairs,
5) the civil war period and its aftermath, 6) the current
impasse and the most recent developments in attempting to
resolve the crisis, 7) the linkages which connect the
Lebanese crisis to the Palestinian problem and the overall
regional Middle East peace process, and 8) the possible
outcomes of the crisis, their respective impacts and the
possible role the U.S. might play in them.
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II. THE HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC SETTING
The Lebanese society of today is a product of the past
influences of ancient Phonecian, early Arab-Islamic, early
Christian, Ottoman and Western European French cultures.
The period of French influence - more specifically the
Mandate period from 1918 until Lebanese independence in
1943 - although the shortest of these cultural influence
periods was nonetheless responsible for the present demo-
cratic governmental system of the state. In reality,
however, this governmental system is to some degree merely
superimposed over a more complex, deeply rooted and under-
lying foundation of religious and feudal family type group
affiliations. More recently, as the political influences in
the country developed, an ideological afinity, particularly
among the dissatisfied mostly Moslem leftist and Nasserist
elements of the population, became yet another means of
identification and group affiliation in Lebanese society.
Throughout its history, the isolated and rugged terrain
of the Lebanese mountains has provided refuge for perse-
cuted religious sects (notably the Christian Maronites, Shiites
and Moslem Druzes). Under the Ottoman administrative millet
system, these religious groups were able to maintain a cer-
tain degree of religious exclusiveness and also a degree
of administrative autonomy. Historically, this local admin-
istrative system was organized around Ziama or clan type
leaders who came to exact a combined religious and family
11

allegiance. Today some 10 Christian sects 1 and the Moslem
Shia, Sunni and Druze sects make up the religious mosaic
of the country.
The 3.2 million population of Lebanon does not seem
to be too noteworthy until one considers that, with the
country's size (4000 square miles) the population density
averages 800 people per square mile (with higher densities
in the urban areas). This population figure includes an
estimated 400,000 Palestinians, the majority of whom live
in refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut. Almost 60
percent of the population is urban, centered around the
coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre. Eastward
of these coastal cities two parallel mountain ranges - the
Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains - run north-south along
Christian denominations in Lebanon include Roman Catholic,
Uniate Catholic, Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Armenian
Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox (Georgian), Syrian
Jacobite, Nestorian, Maronite and Protestant churches. Of
these the Maronites are the largest group overall, com-
prising 30 percent of the Christian community. Thus the
Christian community in Lebanon is often misleadingly
represented synonymously with the Maronites. See Harvey
H. Smith, et al
.
, Area Handbook for Lebanon
,
Second Edition,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974),
pp. 123-129.
2Both the total population of Lebanon and the Palestinian
population figures are estimates based on unofficial census
base figures, growth rates, emigration and civil war
casualties. The 400,000 Palestinians estimate, although
higher than more conservative sources is mentioned both in
Enver M. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System
,
(Washing-
ton D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1976), p. 43 and Elie A. Salem, "Lebanon's
Political Maze: The Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land",




th of the country separated by the
Fifteen miles north of the Lebanon-
.ni turns abruptly west, emptying into
north of the coastal town of Tyre,
line just north of this last portion
k .s come to be referred to as the "red
* I \~
-f J
.eli and Syrian areas of interest in
j ' ibanon area. Thus south Lebanon has
on of Lebanon south of the Litani
of Tyre on the Mediterranean to the
;o the east.
•istic of Lebanon's demographic pattern
is that different geographic areas of the country have come
to be populated by different religious and cultural groups -
during the course of its historic development and more
recently as a result of civil war sectarian tensions. The
central coastal region from Beirut north to Tripoli and
eastward to the Lebanon Mountain foothills has traditionally
been the Christian heartland. This area includes Lebanon's
industrial region and also the major commercial ports.
Resultingly, an overwhelming majority of the wealth of the
country is concentrated and controlled by the Christian
3After the deployment of Syrian troops into Lebanon in June
1976 in an attempt to end the civil war fighting, Israel's
Prime Minister Rabin issued a statement declaring this "red
line" south of which any Syrian troop activity would run
the risk of Israeli involvement. See Salem, "Lebanon's




segment of the population. This will later be shown to be
one of the causes of Lebanon's social unrest and a factor
in the outbreak of the civil war as well. The northern and
central inland portion of the country bordering Syria is
predominantly populated by the Sunni Moslem community.
This is also the area of Lebanon now under military control
of the Syrian forces. The southern half of the country was
initially populated by the Shia Moslem community with the
exception of the mount Lebanon area of the Lebanon Mountains
which is the ancient home of the Druze sect and several
small Christian communities. From 1948 on a growing
Palestinian (Sunni Moslem) refugee community has been added
to Lebanon's population, residing in camps on the periphery
of Beirut, in the southern towns of Tyre and Sidon and with
additional militia camps in the south. As a result of the
civil war fighting in 1976 and 1978 Beirut has effectively
been separated (by an undefined barrier known as the "green
line") into Christian and Moslem sectors. Also a Christian
enclave protected by a breakaway faction of the Lebanese
army along the Israeli border was created with the withdrawal
of an Israeli occupying force and its replacement by a U.N.
interim force in June 1978. Finally, a growing refugee
community of Shia peasants from the south has been displaced
north towards Beirut as a result of Israeli military raids
on Lebanese villages, living in refugee communities alongside
and sometimes even together with those of the Palestinians.
With all these religiously identified groups in Lebanon's
14

small geographic area and with its high population density,
a certain amount of interaction and tension was bound to be
present in Lebanon's society. It was also inevitable that
these tensions would carry over into Lebanon's political
system after independence.
A. THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM
One of the most significant legacies left by the French
administration on the Lebanese governmental system is the
confessional nature of its administrative hierarchy. It is
clear that the French, upon Lebanon's declaration of its inde-
pendence in 1943, wished to retain their economic interests in
the country by assuring that a pro-French (pro-Western) Maronite
Christian predominance in the new state be maintained. This
predominance was legislated by the confessional system of
representation the French instituted in the mid-1920 's - a
system which has remained the heart of the disagreement between
the internal factions in Lebanon. Integral in this sytem is
the unwritten 1943 vintage National Pact, which stipulates
above all that the President of the Republic must be a Maronite
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem and the Chairman
of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Moslem. Supposedly this
system provides for a tri-presidency with each of the major
religious groups represented. In actuality, however, the
president retains the greatest share of executive power -
including that of dismissing the Chamber of Deputies. In
addition to these main provisions, the pact also calls for
15

the distribution of parliamentary seats not only between
Christians and Moslems but also "proportionately (among the
4
sects) within each group." A basic 6 to 5 ratio of Chris-
tian to Moslem representation is maintained, as determined
by a 1932 census (.the last one taken in the state).
Legislation must be passed by a two-thirds majority. The
parliament is elected every 4 years by popular vote.
According to the constitution, the president is elected for
a six year term by a plurality of the Chamber of Deputies
(initially 44, then 66, now 99 members). The president
appoints a prime minister (the actual head of the government)
and the prime minister then appoints his cabinet in concur-
rence with the president - also with proportional sectarian
representation and predominantly from among the deputies.
The chamber of deputies also has approval authority over
the cabinet appointments. Thus the entire federal govern-
mental structure is organized along sectarian or confessional
lines. Originally the 6 to 5 ratio was reflected in the
armed forces and at all levels of government and civil
agencies. Subsequently, however, as Salem explains:
The conflict of 1958 yielded one minor accommodation in
this formula. Since then, appointments to the bureauc-
racy have been made on the basis of half-Christian
half-Muslim; and in February 1976, President Sulayman
Franjiyyah proposed further change in the formula to
make representation in parliament on a 50-50 basis
and further to strengthen the Sunni prime minister.
His proposal is still pending.
^
4Kamal S. S alibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-
1976, (New York: Caravan Books, 1976), p. 163.
5Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in
a Turbulent Land", p. 447.
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The main Moslem grievance against the unreformed
governmental system of the state is that its structure assures
the perpetuation of the now minority Maronite Christian
political ascendancy. As stated by Michael Suleiman:
In essence, the National Pact provided for the continua-
tion of Maronite predominance. This was assured through
the provision of a Maronite president with executive
powers. Also, in the political, military, social and
economic structures of the country, either through the
formula or by circumstances, the Maronites gained the
upper hand."
In political and demographic representational terms, the
confessional system has become anachronistic. It is
generally accepted (although not admitted by the Maronites)
that the Moslem Lebanese population outnumbers that of the
Christians, although a census to verify this has not yet
been taken. In fact, the relatively impoverished yet fast
growing Shia Moslem community is said to be the largest
single sect in the country, according to their former
7
spokesman, Imam Musa Al Sadr. The Shia, however, enjoy the
least effective political representation of all the
Lebanese sects due to their low economic status and lack of
representational elites other than their religious leaders.
Michael W. Suleiman, "Origins of the Lebanese Civil War",
in Fouad Moughrabi and Nasser Aruri , eds., Lebanon - Crisis
and Challenge in the Arab World , Special Report No. 1,
(Detroit: Association of Arab American University Graduates,
January 1977), p. 2.
Najib E. Saliba, "The Lebanese in the Context of the War",
in Lebanon - Crisis and Challenge in the Arab World, p. 8.
17

Another aspect of the sectarian nature of Lebanese
politics is a unique clan or feudal type affiliation which
crosscuts and takes advantage of the basic sectarian
affiliations. Predominant among the Christian sects but
also evident in Junblatt's Druzes , these groups are led by-
strong, politically ambitious and often charismatic leaders
(ziama) and center around a traditional (feudal) dominant
family, thus eliciting fraternal and sectarian loyalties.
According to Salem:
Interspersed throughout the political structure, both
in the center and in local areas, are the ziaras.
Lebanon's decision-making processes can not be understood
or analyzed without major allowance for this element.
The ziams are leaders with almost charismatic power
over their followers, revered and depended upon for
services of all sorts. The more underdeveloped the
region the more likely it is to give rise to ziams. °
With the original leaders of these groups now approaching
70 or 80 years of age a second generation of leadership is
now appearing. The power bases and rivalries among these
groups seem to have been carried over with this new leader-
ship, and perhaps even heightened by assasinations and the
civil war violence. As Koury explains:
Confessional politics in Lebanon is in part characterized
by familial rivalries within the various sub communes
and by overlapping ties among the ruling elites of the
various factions. The balancing process is conditioned
by crosscutting affiliations and sociopolitical and
economic ties."




(Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1973),
p. 13.
g
Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System, p. 20.
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Political elites in the country are thus tied to the
religious and socio-economic structure of Lebanon. The
fact that many of these elites are vying for power or simply
concerned with perpetuating their present degree of power
and influence, rather than working together for the greater
well-being of the country, is certainly a factor in the
continuing conflict. A majority of the elites are Christian,
reflecting in one respect the acute economic imbalance in
the country between Christian and Moslem. Due to the
constitutional provision by which a president of the country
may serve only one 6 year term of office, several of the
elites are led by former presidents who still feel the need
to protect their own political and economic interests. The
private militias of these groups serve to provide this
protection. The elites in general support the National
Pact and maintaining the status quo, since part of their
power is sectarian based. According to Koury
:
The elites in Lebanon appear to share a consensus on
at least one basic value, the preservation of the
system in which they are the elites. They have tried
to bring about reforms while at the same time preserving
their own interests, and their motives are not
exclusively self-serving. The power of the elites
comes mainly from the members of the ethno-religious
communes and sub-communes and from the Lebanese
socio-economic system. 10
A picture of the Lebanese conflict, in its internal
dimensions, as a socio-economic and political struggle thus
begins to emerge.
10 Ibid, p. 14.
19

B. SOCIAL UNREST AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS
Although Lebanon struggled both economically and
politically during the first 15 years of its statehood, this
was not unusual or noteworthy for a new independent nation
as the new international order was being reestablished in
the postwar and cold war era. Greater Western influence
in the Middle East, a growing Arab nationalist reaction to
it, and the establishment of the state of Israel would all
have an impact on Lebanon's internal situation. In what
would become a recurring pattern for Lebanon in the decades
to follow, external forces and influences would bring to
the surface the latent yet ever present disagreement between
the Arab and Western identifying segments of the population
on the character the country should assume. In the period
from 1946 to 1956 (during the presidencies of Al Khouri and
Chamoun) the government had problems establishing its
political legitimacy, yet the state retained a reasonable
degree of internal stability. The most divisive issue of
this period revolved around the relationship and degree of
economic cooperation the state should maintain with its
Arab neighbor Syria. Several regional events, however,
would alter Lebanon's domestic scene in the next few years.
The first of these events was the Suez Crisis and en-
suing Arab-Israeli war in 1956. In response to anti-Western
demonstrations in the country,
A state of emergency was declared in the Lebanon during
the Sinai-Suez Crisis at the end of October 1956. The
20

Chamber of Deputies announced its support of Egypt,
but the Lebanon did not break off diplomatic relations
with Great Britain and France. In November there were
disturbances, however, at Tripoli and Beirut against the
attitude of the government .
H
The Eisenhower Doctrine, revealed in January 1957, provided
a second cause for anti-Western sentiment in the country
and a widening of the split between the government and the
Moslem Arab political elements. President Chamoun readily
accepted U.S. military, financial and economic aid offered
by the program in return for a pro-Western, anti-Communist
stance adopted by Lebanon in its foreign policy alignment.
However, this alignment was not well received by elements
and political groups in the country favoring greater Arab
solidarity and unity.
This split of opinion in Lebanon became heightened
during the campaign for parlaimentary elections in June 1957.
The negotiations leading to the formation of the United
Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, influenced by the appeal
to Arab unity and Arab socialism espoused by Egypt's
President Jamal Abd Al-Nasir, provided yet another tension
producing factor in the situation. There was significant
Nasirist support in Lebanon, particularly among those Moslem
political groups that had always favored greater Syrian-
Lebanese ties. Lebanon's leadership rejected its inclusion
in either Nasir's UAR or the Arab Federation of Jordan and
Iraq, established in reaction to the UAR formation, as
1:LThe Middle East and North Africa , 26th Edition, (London
Europa Publications, Ltd., 1979), p. 517.
21

arrangements which, would lead only to a limitation of
Lebanese sovereignty. The Christian Western influence here
is obvious. An attempt to reorganize the government in
March 1958 in order to remove pro-Western cabinet members
failed to quell popular resentment of Lebanese policy and
alignment among the Moslem population. Serious disturbances
and pro-Arab demonstrations continued to plague the country
and threaten internal order. President Chamoun was reluctant
to order the predominantly Christian army units to attempt
to control the predominantly Moslem demonstrations.
The situation in Chamoun ' s eyes really became critical
when a bloody coup occurred in Iraq in July 1958. Fearing
the same fate - as pan-Arab elements were mobilizing
greater support in the region:
. . .
President Chamoun requested the United States
to send American troops into Lebanon with a view to
the maintenance of security and the preservation of
Lebanese independence. By July 20th, some 10,000
men of the United States forces were stationed in and
around Beirut. ^-^
The presence of this external peacekeeping force and the
approaching end of Chamoun ' s presidency brought about a
gradual ease of tensions in the next few months. On July
31, 1958 the Chamber of Deputies elected Fuad Chehab,
former Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army, as President
of State. Upon assuming the presidency in September 1958,
Chehab enjoyed popular support from some members of both sides
in the internal conflict and his appointment of opposition





quieting Moslem discontent. U.S. forces left Lebanon in
October 1958 following an agreement between the U.S., Lebanon
and the United Nations. Although the 1958 crisis had resulted
in some sectarian fighting and internal disorder, a degree
of normalcy was returned to the country with the Chehab ad-
ministration. Electoral and economic reforms (a program
which would become known as Chehabism) took place in Lebanon
in the ensuing years. Normal parlaimentary elections were
held and the cabinet restructured to include opposition
elements and greater sectarian representation.
Lebanon's political stability, however, remained as
always a very delicate and easily upset balance. Resignations
of opposition leaders in the cabinet - notably Druze leader
Junblatt - were normal and new governments were formed on
an almost regular basis. In December 1961, a more serious
challenge to the government occurred. Abdallah SaadeT
leader of the pro-Syrian National Social party, attempted an
unsuccessful coup. President Chehab' s reaction was strong,
dissolving the party, purging its members and imprisoning
Saade. Syrian complicity in the coup attempt served to
again sour Lebanese-Syrian relations. Except for this in-
cident, however, Lebanon would remain free from destabilizing
outside influences during the remainder of the first half
of the 1960s decade.
23

C. THE PALESTINIAN FACTOR
The Palestinian community in Lebanon originated in 1948
when a portion of the refugees displaced by the formation of
the state of Israel and the ensuing 1948 Arab-Israeli war
fled their homeland into Lebanon. Further migrations occur-
red after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when the West Bank and
Gaza were occupied by Israel. A great number of these
displaced Palestinians remained in refugee communities
rather than assimilating into the Lebanese Arab community -
clinging proudly to their Palestinian identity. Even some
of those who became educated and did assimilate into Lebanese
society later became radicalized and returned to the
forefront of Palestinian militancy (see Chapter III, Section
C). In the early 1960s, when the Palestinian commando units
were organized and began their military training, Lebanon
became one of the sites of these training camps. In 1964
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed,
initially uniting the different commando groups under the
leadership of a common executive committee. A united policy
of conducting commando raids into Israel from Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon was also decided, with the first of such raids
conducted by Yasir Arafat's Fateh in January 1965 against
a water pumping station in Israel.
These Palestinian commando raids into Israel, which
brought swift and commensurate Israeli retaliation, continued
13Susannan Tarbush, "The Divided Front", Arab Report and
Record
,
16-31 August 1978, p. 615.
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sporadically for the next several years. Added to and
more vindictive than these commando raids were Palestinian
terrorist acts perpetrated against Israeli citizens even
outside the Middle East which began to occur at this time.
By these acts the Palestinian groups, a majority of which
had their headquarters in Beirut, hoped to bring international
attention to their cause against Israel; but in fact they
succeeded only in alienating world opinion against them.
The Israelis - holding Lebanon liable for these Palestinian
acts initiated from Lebanon based groups - escalated the
conflict in late 1968. In retaliation for a Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attack on an El Al
airliner in Athens on 26 December 1968, Israeli commando
units struck Beirut International Airport two days later
and destroyed 13 Lebanese commercial aircraft, escaping
14
unharmed. This incident not only sparked demonstrations
by Lebanese citizens against the inability of the Lebanese
military to prevent the attack, but also helped to mobilize
popular support among the Lebanese Moslem left for the
Palestinian cause versus Israel.
Clashes between Palestinian units and Israeli army
units across the southern Lebanon border continued during
the next two years, with Lebanese villagers in the south
frequently becoming caught in between the two. Although
sentiment against the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon
14Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976, p. 38
25

was beginning to grow among the Christian Lebanese community,
a conciliatory approach by the Lebanese government was
adopted. On November 3, 1969 a pact which would come to be
called the "Cairo Agreement" was made between the PLCs
Yasir Arafat and Lebanese Army Commander in Chief Bustani
giving the Palestinian militias freedom to continue
military training in their camps, the right to carry arms
in their areas and thus implicit permission to continue their
15
commando raids into Israel. In response to further
Palestinian raids, Israeli army units in May and again in
September 1970 made deep penetrations into southern Lebanon
with armored forces - remaining on Lebanese territory for
32 hours and 2 days respectively, until forced to withdraw
by U.N. and U.S. pressure.
At the same time, other Palestinian units were conducting
raids into the occupied West Bank area (annexed by Israel
after the 1967 war) from bases in Jordan - also eliciting
Israeli retaliatory attacks. Jordan's King Husain, however,
was not as tolerant of the growing military power of the
armed Palestinian presence as was Lebanon. Husain moved
his army against the Palestinians in what would become known
16
as "black September" 1970. As a result of this confrontation
15Michael C. Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese
Civil War", The Middle East Journal , Vol. 32, No. 3,
(Summer 1978), p. 264.
The Syrians then intervened on behalf of the Palestinians
by moving tank brigades into Jordan, but withdrew under
U.S. and Israeli pressure. See Sidney Nettleton Fisher, The
Middle East - A History , Third Edition, (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., 1979), p. 712.
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a majority of the Palestinian units crossed over into Syria
and then into southern Lebanon. This caused a temporary
lull in the commando actions while the Palestinians re-
grouped and reorganized their forces.
The Israeli incursions and guerrilla losses in the
war in Jordan in September 1970 led to a curtailment
of guerrilla activity. During 1971 there were only
a few instances of raids and counter-raids across the
southern border of Lebanon. 1?
The period 1972-1975 brought an escalation of activities
involving Israeli forces, the Palestinians, Lebanese Array
units and finally Lebanese Christian militias in the prelude
to the outbreak of civil war. First of all, a resumption
of Palestinian raids into Israel by the commandos resulted
in another Israeli 4 day "land and air operation against
guerrilla strongholds in the foothills of Mount Hermon in
southeast Lebanon on February 24, 1972.
"
18 On May 30, 1972
the Palestinians sought retribution in a senseless attack
by Japanese terrorists (hired by the PFLP) on the Lod
Airport passenger terminal resulting in 25 Israeli civilian
deaths. This was followed by yet another Israeli
retaliatory raid on Palestinian bases in south Lebanon.
Finally, in one of the most infamous incidents of Palestinian
terrorism, 11 Israeli Olympic athletes were killed by Black
20
September terrorists during the Munich Olympics in September.
1 7
Smith, et al .
,
Area Handbook for Lebanon , P. xxvm
18 Ibid
19New York Times, 31 May 1972.
20 New York Times, 6 September 1972.
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Again, Israel responded to the Munich incident by conducting
strikes into south Lebanon in what had now become an
established pattern in the Palestinian-Israeli feud.
Although Lebanon remained uninvolved in the Arab-
Israeli war in October 1973, its army had been active since
May 1973 attempting to control (and inevitably clashing with)
the Palestinian commando units within its borders. Syria
temporarily closed its border with Lebanon in support of
the guerrillas until Lebanon finally was pressured to
abandon this use of its army and air force against the
Palestinian camps. The Syrians constituted a long time
supplier of arms to the Palestinian commandos, which Lebanon
was in no real position to stop. Thus Lebanon was unable
to execute effective control over Palestinian activities
even within its own territory. From this time on, until
the Lebanese civil war broke out in earnest in late 1973,
it was the newly organized Christian militias (established
in response to the increasing armed Palestinian presence)
which began clashing with the Palestinian units in sporadic
yet increasing violence. As these clashes continued, the
Christian-Moslem split in the country widened over the
Palestinian armed presence and tended to unite separate
factions on each side. As Salem states:
The Muslin Lebanese leaders, in a sense, tried to
exploit the Palestinians to gain greater power in
the Lebanese governmental system, and the Palestinians
exploited the Muslim politicans to increase
Palestinian weight in the Lebanese political system.
Palestinian activism in Lebanon in the 1970s coincided
with Sunni activism to secure more power for the prime
28

minister's office and to make representation in Parliament
on a 50-50 basis.
. . . The Phalangist and the Liberal
Christian parties saw in an armed Sunni Palestinian
movement working closely with Muslim Lebanese parties
the end of Lebanon's precarious political balance,
so they, too, intensified the arming of their militias.
The confrontation to follow was now more or less predestined.
In order to better clarify the events of the civil war
fighting in 1975-1976 and 1978 (Section IV) the internal
factions and alliances and the external actors in the growing
crisis will first be described in Section III.
D. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTOR
The events involving the Palestinian commandos, Israeli
and Lebanese army units and the Lebanese militias, although
important, do not fully explain the causes of the Lebanese
crisis which had their roots in this mid-1960s to mid-1970s
decade. Of equal importance were some significant events
related to Lebanon's economic and social order during this
period. The first of these was the collapse of Intra Bank
in Beirut in 1966 - under suspicious circumstances. Beginning
in the early 1960s, Lebanon had become the financial and
banking center of the Middle East, with capital from the
emerging oil exporting countries plus Lebanese entrepreneurial
profits and income from the trans-Arabian pipeline (which
terminated in Tripoli) invested overseas through Beirut banks.
A great majority of these banks were owned by Christian
21 Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in
a Turbulent Land", p. 453.
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Lebanese. Intra Bank was owned by two Palestinians - one
Christian and one Moslem. In 1966 an unexplained run on its
assets caused it to fold. The repercussions of this action,
however intended, spread to the entire Lebanese banking
community. According to Salibi:
The blow to the reputation of Lebanon as an on-coming
financial center in the world, which the collapse of
Intra caused, was indeed tremendous as was the blow
to the domestic economy; but the upstart had been
destroyed. In Palestinian circles, the destruction
of the Intra institution aroused bitter feelings, and
those Palestinians who had come to identify themselves
with Lebanon began to have second thoughts about
their adopted loyalty. 22
Social unrest began to surface in Lebanon in the early
1970s in response to the situation in the south (the Israeli-
Palestinian clashes) and to other perceived inequities in the
Lebanese system. Predominantly this social unrest was manifest
in the form of well organized and large strikes. Imam Mousa
Al Sadr organized strikes to protest the inability of the state
to protect the Shia peasants of the south and the unfulfilled
promise of the state to arm the Shias in order to protect
themselves. Students struck for educational reform and for
better job opportunities. Workers struck to protest high in-
flation, and erosion of the middle class living standard and
for greater wages and benefits.
None of the strikes was of very long duration, but it
became increasingly clear that the strike was becoming 23
the basic economic weapon of Lebanese workers at all levels.
22Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976 , p. 30
23
Smith, et al., Area Handbook for Lebanon, p. xix.
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This socio-economic dissatisfaction, together with the
growing Palestinian problem, would continue to plague the
administration of President Franjiyyeh from 1970-1976 and
would be the cause of the successive failure of numerous
governments under various prime ministers. The social unrest
made it difficult for any prime minister to gain acceptance
and popular support.
Also occurring during this period were strikes and
protests staged by the Lebanese left in support of the
Palestinians and against Israel and the policy of suppression
of Palestinian commando activities being carried out by the
Lebanese army at the time. As Salibi states:
Popular demonstrations upholding the Palestinian right
to unrestricted commando action from Lebanon against
Israel condemned the attempts on the part of the Lebanese
authorities to keep the commando movement under control,
and the communists and Ba'th socialists, working in
close association with Kamal Janbalat and his
Progressive Socialist Party, invariably appeared at
the head of these demonstrations. 24
Once this pattern of demonstration and protest against the
government's policies was established, it consequently offered
the opportunity for the Lebanese left to vocalize their
demands for political reform and attempt to mobilize Moslem
support. The main grievances of the Lebanese left were
socio-economic as well as political, as explained in the
introduction to the Transitional Program of the Lebanese
National Movement (formed in 1976):
94.
Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976, p. 38
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Under the pretext of protecting "free enterprise", the
Lebanese economic system has become a hotbed for chaos,
recurrent crises, and the rise of monopolies, which
have been accompanied by rising costs of living. It
has become the basic factor in obstructing Lebanon's
economic development at the expense of the principal
productive sectors. ... At the social level, privi-
ledges are more and more being concentrated in the
hands of a small minority controlling the national
resources, while the overwhelming majority is living
under steadily worsening conditions of employment and
declining standards of living. 2^
Although perhaps a somewhat biased picture, this
statement does allude to a great disparity in per capita
income (and thus living standard) between the Christian and
Moslem communities in Lebanon. Exact figures on this dis-
crepancy are difficult to obtain (as is census data), but
according to Koury
:
An interview by this author with an economist at the
American University of Beirut revealed that in the
early 1970s some 4 percent of the population of
Lebanon received about 35 percent of all income while
the lower 50 percent of the population received approx-
imately 20 percent of all income. The income of the
other 46 percent of population (which is to say, the
middle class) was about 30 percent of overall income. 26
This skewed distribution of income must be recognized as
one of the major preconditions of the 1975-1976 civil war
fighting, which was carried out mainly by discontented
27
middle class and urban lower class elements. Paradoxically,
no.
From The Transitional Program of the Lebanese National
Movement
,
translated and distributed by the Middle East
Research and Information Project, Washington, D.C., (February
1977), p. 6.





as Salem points out
;
The middle and lower middle classes, who are less mobile
than the wealthy or the labor classes, and who depend
on fixed incomes, have experienced economic hardships
as a result of the war. 28
This fact, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the
failure of the Lebanese governmental system and political
elites to respond to socio-economic problems in the country,
which ultimately contributed its part to the creation of
the civil war atmosphere of lost faith in the democratic
institutions of the state.
28Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in
a Turbulent Land", p. 455.
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III. ACTORS AND FACTIONS
If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil
people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds,
and it were necessary only to separate them from the
rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing
good and evil cuts through the heart of every human
being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his
own heart.
from The Gulag Archipelago by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
In order to better understand the different groups which
became involved in the Lebanese civil war fighting, it will
be helpful to first present the actors and factions involved
in the dispute, their ideologies and aspirations, and the
alliances they formed in response to the civil war violence.
This will include the internal factions in Lebanon, the
Palestinians, and the major external actors which, as will
be shown, all have their impact on Lebanon's continued strife
as well as their own reasons and justifications for their
involvement in Lebanese affairs. The proliferation of these
groups, even within the major sectarian divisions, reflects
both the feudal family alliegances, political power aspirations
and diversity of ideologies alluded to previously. This
phenomenon underscores the complexity of Lebanese society
and also reflects the internal and external sources of
division in the country. Yet it still fails to explain the
spark which brought devastating civil war violence to the
country or to provide clues to the "line dividing good and
evil" in the hearts of the Lebanese citizens who resorted to
violence in order to protect the particular interests of their
34

group. The divergent ideologies and personal convictions of
ttie leadership of these groups, however, provide somewhat of
a focus on the political differences in the country and their
inherent incompatibility with one another.
The internal factions involved in the Lebanese conflict
are best organized for descriptive purposes into two basic
groups - the Christians and the Moslems. These of course are
generalizations, since the groups are predominantly but not
exclusively comprised of one religious group or sect. The
Christian groups, as a rule, are almost exclusively Maronite,
while the leftist oriented groups share both Moslem and
Christian (other than Maronite) leadership. Also, the
Christian groups are generally labelled as rightists and the
Moslems as leftists, since the Christians support maintaining
the confessional system and the status quo while the Moslems
want to see secularization or other changes (radical or not,
depending on one's point of view) brought about in the Lebanese
government. It must also be noted that these groups represent
only the politically and/or militarily active members of their
community.
A. THE CHRISTIAN/RIGHTISTS
The Christian (Maronite) groups have been at different
times referred to as the Rightists, the Establishment Alliance
or the Lebanese Front. This group contains some of the more
powerful political leaders in the country and also the largest
best organized and trained militias. The most active among
35

these are the Phalangist (Kata'ib) Party under the leadership
of Pierre Gemayel, the National Liberal Party under former
Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, and the Liberation Array
of Zghorta (or Zghortawis) under again a former Lebanese
president - Suleiman Franjiyyeh. All three of these parties
are organized around the leadership of their feudal/ family
figureheads (ziama) and their militias serve (in part) to
protect the territories these families control - the Maronite
north for Franjiyyeh (.centered around the town of Zghorta)
and the Beirut/Mount Lebanon areas for Chamoun and Gemayel.
The Phalangists, founded in 1936, are the oldest
Maronite party and have remained dedicated to the maintenance
of Maronite ascendancy in Lebanon. Stressing what it calls
the "Lebanese national character" as opposed to any notion
of Lebanese Arab nationalism, the group's philosophy is best
expressed in the claim of Gemayel (who has served in several
cabinet positions in past Lebanese administrations) that
"since the Christians pay eighty per cent of the taxes in
29
Lebanon they are entitled to eighty per cent of the services."
The party is also strongly anti-socialist. One estimate
gave its militia a strength of 10,000 men during the course
30
of the 1976 civil war fighting. It was militia units from
the Phalangists which were in the forefront of the Christian-
Palestinian clashes which led to this phase of the civil war.
29
Saliba, "The Lebanese in the Context of the War", p. 5.
30
Keesing' s Contemporary Archives , June 11, 1976, p. 27767
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The basic aims of this rightist party must also be tempered
by the long time presidential aspirations of their leader
Pierre Gemayel (Jumayyil). As Salibi notes:
As the Kata'ib Party, beginning in April 1970, began
to press its campaign for Jumayyil as the next
Lebanese President, the first signs of opposition
to his candidacy appeared, To the Lebanese political
establishment, and to Lebanese opinion in general,
the thought of having the leader of a well-organized
party of para-military character established in power
as Head of State was distasteful . 31
Despite the failures in his bid for the presidency, the
tenacious Gemayil, who has survived several assasination
attempts, remains a figure of great power and respect in
the Lebanese Christian community.
The National Liberal Party CNLP), another strong
Christian/rightist group, is reputed to have been established
in 1958 by Camille Chamoun at the end of his presidency "in
order to endure as a political leader and compete for
32
Maronite leadership." The party is not as tightly organized
as the Phalangists and is held together primarily by
Chamoun 's charismatic leadership. The party enjoys wide
popular support in the Christian community, as Salibi states:
The P.N.L. emerged after 1958 as the unrivalled
representative of the Christian ethos in Lebanon. Its
support came from every part of the country. Christian
villagers from the mountain regions and the Biqa,
leading bankers and businessmen and small merchants,
contractors and brokers, clergymen and monks of every
Christian sect,





and slum- dwellers in the humbler quarters of Beirut
and its suburbs, were all "Shamumist" by sentiment,
unless they happened to be recruited to the Kata'ib
party. 33
Camille's son Danny stands ready to assume the party
leadership after his father, The militia of the NLP , called
the Tigers, frequently operates together with the Phalangist
units, and was estimated to be 20,000 strong in 1976.
Sharing basically the same views on Maronite ascendancy as
the Phalangists, the two groups also are in agreement on two
other controversies in the Lebanese conflict. Both groups
advocate an end to the armed Palestinian and the Syrian Arab
Deterrent Force (ADF) presence in Lebanon.
The third largest Christian group is organized around
the leadership of former president Suleiman Franjiyyeh in
the Christian portion of northern Lebanon. Franjiyyeh'
s
motives are certainly close to those of Chamoun with regard
to remaining a political power contender, but his orientation
is more Christian Arab. This group's militia, the Liberation
Army of Zghorta, was organized and led by Franjiyyeh 's son
35
Tony, and is estimated to be 7,000 strong. As president
during the 1975-1976 portion of the civil war, Franjiyyeh
came to rely on Syrian support in order to retain his
presidency and bring an end to the violence. As Syrian
interest and influence in Lebanese affairs heightened, cul-









a personal friendship also developed between Syria's President
Assad and Franjiyyeh. This relationship, however, was ill-
fated. Franjiyyeh's support for the Syrian military presence
in Lebanon brought him into opposition with the other Maronite
leaders, Chamoun and Gemayel. Some time later, in June 1978,
in another of the inexplicable acts of violence for which
Lebanon has now become infamous, Franjiyyeh's son Tony,
along with his wife and thirty other supporters were killed
in a small arms, rocket and grenade attack on their home
in Ehden, near Tripoli. Members of Pierre Gemayel 's
Phalangists were implicated in the killings. This vendetta
type enmity perhaps better than anything else illustrates
the crosscutting family rivalries present even within the
powerful Maronite community.
In addition to these three main factions, several other
groups complete the Christian Lebanese elements. These range
from the more moderate National Bloc of presidential contender
Raymond Edde to the breakaway Christian army faction under
Major Haddad. Edde r s National Bloc has strived for accommo-
dation with the more moderate Moslem leadership and elements
in the country. Although originating as a pro-Western (pro-
French) party under Raymond's father, Emile, who had been
president during the French Mandate period (1936-1941), the
party was slowly transformed into a mediating party, attempting
to unite and reconcile all elements in the country (.quite an
0£?
Arab Report and Record
,
No. 12 (.16-30 June 1978).
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ambitious task). Edde ' s popular appeal, however, has thus
never been great enough among the Christian community to
accomplish his election to the presidency. He is equally
opposed to the more uncompromising alternatives of continued
Maronite ascendancy or partition into a separate Christian
state, as espoused by the Phalangists and the NLP. Although
allied in the past with Chamoun's National Liberals, Edde is
vehemently against the Phalangists and their activities. As
Salibi explains:
As "Dean" of the National Bloc, Raymond Iddi abandoned
his father's fervent hostility toward pan-Arabism,
replacing it with an equally fervent ardour for
anti-militarism. 37
After several assasination attempts, however, there are
indications of a change in Edde ' s original anti-military
stance, perhaps revealing the necessity of the times for
political survival in Lebanon. According to one source,
"The National Bloc has no organized militia, but has armed
partisans, notably in Jbail (Byblos) and in several mountain
38
villages which are Mr. Edde's strongholds." The National
Bloc is also reported to maintain militiamen in "certain
39Christian areas of Beirut."
The breakaway Christian faction of the Lebanese army,
on the other hand, is not much more than a private militia -
although a well armed one. Operating along the southern
37
Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976 , p. 5
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border of Lebanon, reputedly in collaboration with Israeli
units against Palestinian commando camps, Major Haddad's
faction on 18 April 1979 declared the "State of Free Lebanon"
in the south Lebanon area over which he exercises military
control. This has earned him the disaffection of even his
fellow Maronite leaders, who have branded him as a "renegade."
This Christian held enclave along Lebanon's southern border
with Israel is also reputed to provide a channel for Israeli
support of other Christian factions. As stated in the Arab
Report :
The Falange and the National Liberal parties have been
armed by Israel through the rightist enclaves in the
south, and through the port of Jounieh north of Beirut. 40
Through the "good fence" opened between the Christian enclave
and Israel in the eastern border area, greater economic and
military cooperation between Haddad's forces (and the civilian
population he protects) and Israel had been developed. This
de facto partition of Lebanese territory represented by the
Christian enclave has ominous implications for future Lebanese
sovereignty and thus is opposed by the Lebanese leadership.
Although Haddad is not a powerful political and family head
as are the other Lebanese leaders, his military strength
and Israeli backing make him an increasingly important
force in the country and especially in the disputed south
Lebanon area.
40Susannah Tarbush, "Lebanon - Leftists in Search of Unity",
Arab Report, (9May 1979), p. 8.
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Completing the array of Christian groups in the country
is a variety of smaller units which have armed themselves
and organized small militias for self protection and in
order to exert their identity and authority in the atmos-
phere of decaying civil order in Lebanon. These groups
include the Maronite League, the Maronite Order of Monks, the
Defenders of the Cedars led by Said Akl , the Maronite
Organization led by Fouad Chemali, the Lebanese Nationalist
Front and the Front for the Freedom and the Man.
It could easily be deduced, after this account, that
the Maronite community of Lebanon displays little of a
Christian ethic. It must be remembered, however, that not
all of Lebanon's Christians are militant rightists. Yet,
there does seem to be somewhat of a dichotomy of Christian
opinion in the country. A Maronite priest explains his
co-religionists thus:
The Maronite community is politically and culturally an
Arab community despite occasional efforts to give it
a different coloration. That this community has certain
particular characteristics is due largely to its
historical personality. "Ancestral fear" is not unique
to Maronites or to Lebanon; it is to be found among
most Christians in the orient. Furthermore, while the
mountains may protect, it offers no security as history
proves on repeated occasions. . . . Separation is neither
Christian nor Maronite. The idea of a small Lebanon has
been perpetuated by the landed clergy and by the feudal
chiefs to preserve their petty interests. 42
41
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In contrast, others see the Maronite viewpoint in a far
different light. The direct opposites are intriguing if
not confusing. In the Middle East Annual Review Patrick
Seale writes
:
The Lebanese Christian, and particularly the Maronite,
now feels light years apart from his Muslim fellow
citizens; he feels himself a product of a completely
different civilization, of a different value system
altogether, and no amount of dialogue will persuade
him that the "Arab nation" is his home. The atrocities,
suffered and committed, have bred an alienation which
at bottom drives the Maronites to seek if not a
separate state, at least a wide measure of self govern-
ment. It is not that the Christians feel that they
belong to Europe: rather that they alone, and not
their Muslim compatriots, are the only true Lebanese. 3
Given these widely polarized and perhaps slightly exagerated
opinions, it is far too simplistic to say that the truth
lies somewhere between the two. It would be safer to say
that there are elements of truth in each and that there are
those individuals who ascribe either to the most moderate
and the most extreme positions.
One further observation also seems apparent at this
point - which will hold true for all the Lebanese groups
and the Palestinians as well. That is, sectarianism seems
to play an equally divisive as well as a unifying role even
among the different factions of the major opposing groups.
This is best illustrated by clashes between the Maronites
and the Armenians (Christians) which have occurred in October
1978 and again in late 1979. These clashes were the result
of Maronite attempts to force the Armenians out of the Mount
42Patrick Seale, "Lebanon", Middle East Annual Review , (London
Middle East Annual Review Co., Ltd., 1979), p. 256.
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Lebanon area and to force them to end their long standing
neutrality in the civil war fighting. 44 Incidents such as
these bring into question whether sectarian strike can ever
be brought to an end in Lebanon.
B. THE MOSLEM/ LEFTISTS
The Moslem led groups in Lebanon have been referred to
similarly as the Leftists, the Progressives (or the Progressive
Parties Front), the Patriotic and Progressive Forces, and
more recently the Lebanese National Movement and the
Nationalist Front. The commonly used Moslem/ leftists
identification given to these groups is actually even more
of a misnomer than the Christian/rightist label, since in
basic ideological terms the secularization inherent in leftist
dogma is anathema to the Moslem Islamic faith. Also there
is a fairly high Christian representation among the leftist
groups (and especially among the Palestinians). The Moslem/
leftist labeling of these groups, then, stems mostly from
their opposition to Lebanese Maronite political ascendancy
and their desire to transform the Lebanese system - by
radical or revolutionary means if necessary.
One of the major groups representing and attempting to
unite the Lebanese left is the Progressive Socialist Party -
now under Walid Junblatt. Walid's father, Kamal Junblatt,
founded the party in 1949 and until his assasination in
March 1977 was one of the leading non-Christian leaders of
44,
'Maronite Challenge", The Middle East , (October 1979), p. 20.
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Lebanese politics, having held several cabinet posts. The
party, under the traditional leadership of the Junblatt
family, represents a majority of the tribes of the Druze
sect in Lebanon. Kamal Junblatt always considered himself
a prospective presidential candidate and it was over
continuation of the National Pact (prohibiting his candidacy)
that his militia clashed with Chamoun's National Liberals
in the 1958 civil war. As Salibi explains the PSP goals:
The party principles reflect the personality of its
founder: a mixture of eighteenth century European
rationalism, Utopian socialism and Indian philosophy.
The party aims to establish a new society based on
evolutionary socialism all over the world beginning
with Lebanon. . . .Hence PSP's future society will
be based on reason, harmony and unity, and free from
want, exploitation, class distinction and violence. 45
The PSP is reported to maintain a 3000 man militia in the
46
mountain areas of south Lebanon.
Although accused of supporting the Palestinian issue
for their own political purposes, the PSP has in the past
been a vanguard unit in pro-Palestinian protest. As leader
of the National Movement political coalition, the PSP became
even more closely associated with, the Palestinian cause.
According to Salibi: *
When, after the October War, the National Movement and
the Palestinians began to co-ordinate their forces more
closely for political action, political issues which
were distinctly Palestinian became confused with Lebanese
domestic issues, to such a degree that it became difficult,
if not impossible, to disentangle them from one another. 47
45Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War Lebanon 1958-1976 , p. 7




Walid Junblatt, though somewhat reluctantly, is fast
becoming the leader and spokesman of not only his party,
but of all the progressive forces represented by the Lebanese
National Movement coalition. Although he still speaks of
his slain father as "our leader", it is clear that the
Moslem masses who have rallied to the National Movement
founded by his father now look to him for leadership. Walid
has become the leading spokesman for the Transitional
Program of the Lebanese National Movement as well. This
document, promulgated in 1975, spells out the manner in which
the Lebanese government should be reorganized. Walid' s basic
feeling is that "at present the main danger is the threat
against the unity of Lebanon and the identity of Lebanon as
an Arab state.", and he has adopted a moderate if not
optimistic stance. As he states:
It is possible to have a general dialogue between all
parties and decide on a new formula for Lebanon. The
progressive parties have a program. It is possible to
redefine this program, to rearrange it, to discern the
intentions and opinions of the other side and to reach
a compromise. But there is no dialogue. ^8
It remains to be seen, of course, whether some of the more
radical or Marxist groups in the National Movement would
support such a compromise solution, should such a dialogue,
as suggested by Junblatt, take place. It also goes without
saying that the Moslem left obviously has less to lose than
the now dominant Christian/right in such a compromise.
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The next most influential group in the National Movement
is the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) under Nicola Shawi.
Formerly associated with, the Syrian Communist Party, the
LCP was legalized in 1970 by Kamal Junblatt while he held the
Minister of Interior post. Not particularly revolutionary
in character, the party has grown during the civil war fighting
and is also 30 percent Christian. As for its ideas:
Unlike orthodox communism, the Lebanese Communist Party
(LCP) from its inception has disclaimed any plans to
abolish private property and establish a socialist
system. Instead it has been very mild - revisionist
one may say - in its approach. The LCP supports
Lebanese independence, national solidarity, and calls
for moderate political, economic and social reforms. 4^
The party's support of the National Movement and its PSP
leadership is explained by a LCP official who states: "One
of the most important features of the LNM is that it is an
alliance between communists, progressive nationalists and
other democratic forces."
The LCP is also known to be closely associated with and
supportive of the Palestinian movement. Another communist
group, however, the Organization for Communist Action in
Lebanon (OCAL), under Muhsen Ibrahim and Fawwaz Trabulsi,
is even more closely associated with the Palestinians, and
particularly with the "Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (DFLP) in conjunction with which it publishes
49Saliba, "The Lebanese in the Context of the War", p. 6
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51 *the weekly Al Hurriya . " Explaining OCAL's position
Trabulsi states:
Presently we are a whole Lebanese organization, comprising
representatives of both the confessions, and firmly
entrenched within the basic classes of Lebanese society,
especially the poorer classes, in the south, the Beqaa,
the mountains and the suburbs of Beirut.
. . Politically
and theoretically, we believe we have adapted Marxism
to the particularities of the Lebanese Political systems
and social formations. Consequently, we have given a
lot of attention to the question of confessionalism, as
central to the whole social structure of the country. 52
These two separate communist parties (.the LCP and OCAL) have
a close relationship, and it can be assumed that some Soviet
influence is infused into the Lebanese left and the Palestinian
left through these organizations.
Completing the ranks of the National Movement are
various groups of different socialist persuasions. The National
Syrian Social Party (NSSP), dating back to 1932, was originally
right wind (Nazi fascist inspired) and then swung left - turning
Marxist. The party, now under Abdullah Saade , has recovered
some of its former prominence after its supression following
the 1961 coup attempt it orchestrated. Saade, imprisoned after
the coup attempt, was later released and returned to reassume
the party leadership. Its aims, however, remain the same.
The NSSP believes in the unity of greater Syria -
defined by Antoun Saadeh as stretching from the Taurus
mountains and the Zagros mountains to the Suez Canal
and Red Sea, and from the Mediterranean (including Cyprus)
to the Arabian Gulf. 53
51Tarbush, "The Divided Front", p. 8.
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Needless to say, the party is closely aligned with Syria. The
NSSP membership is mostly Greek Orthodox Christian, and it main-
tains its own independent militia in current Lebanese fashion.
The Pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party, its ideas of pan-Arabism and
Arab socialism popular with many of the poorer Moslem Lebanese,
is another leftist affiliated group. Also, numerous Nasserite
groups, the most significant of which is the Independent Nasserite
Movement under Ibrahim Qualayat, are included in the National
Movement. As a member of this group sums up its ideology:
Our movement has carried the torch of Arab nationalism,
and the most prominent defense of Arab nationalism and
Arab unity. Arab nationalism and Arab unity are not
just political objectives - they are an attitude, feeling,
a way of life for which we are fighting. ^4
This group is also known by the name given to its militia -
the Murabitoun - which battled Christian militias in the
hotel district of Beirut in the 1976 civil war. Finally
completing the menagerie of the National Movement are even
smaller groups such as the Arab Socialist Union, the Arab
Socialist Action Party and the Lebanese Movement For Supporting
Fateh. 55
For a variety of reasons, the Lebanese leftists are
united in their support of the Palestinians and their presence,
armed or not, in Lebanon. The Palestinians are regarded as
54
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both an added Moslem complement to the population (despite
their self-imposed status as a refugee community) and as a
Lebanese leftist ally in the fight against the Christian
militias. For although not to their overall liking, the
Palestinians have found that they could not maintain an armed
presence in Lebanon and remain uninvolved in the civil war
fighting. As for the role of Syria in the maintenance of
Lebanese internal security, this issue would cause a split in
the Lebanese left just as it had among the Christian groups.
Syria's military intervention into Lebanon during the
1976 civil war, in opposition to the Palestinian/leftist
forces and thus in support of the Christians, sealed its fate
in the eyes of the National Movement. Several of the leftist
groups, however, broke away from the National Movement to
support and work with the Syrian Arab Deterrent Force.
According to the Arab Report:
This grouping, which became known as the Nationalist
Front, accepted the "constitutional document" announced
on 14 Feburary 1976 after talks in Damascus between
President Franjiyya and Syrian leaders. . . . Member
groups of the Nationalist Front included the (Nasserite)
Union of Working Peoples Forces (whose leader, Kamal
Shatila, is Secretary General of the Nationalist Front),
The Pro-Syrian wing of the Lebanese Baath Party (led
by Assem Qansom), the faction of the NSSP led by Issam
Mahayri and a rightist Kurdish party Rozkari . It was
joined in June 1977 by Talal Merhabi's Lebanese
Confrontation Front. °
Although the Nationalist Front is now small in both
constituency and number of affiliated groups compared to the
56
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National Movement, the Front has been actively recruiting new
members, especially from among the Ba'thist and Nasserite
elements on the periphery of the National Movement. Also as
the Syrian ADF in Lebanon has become more legitimized, so
has the appeal of the Nationalist Front become greater.
Two other Moslem but not particularly leftist groups
must also be considered among the Lebanese factions - one for
its military strength and the other for its growing appeal to
a large Lebanese Moslem segment of the population and for its
growing militancy. The first of these is the Moslem breakaway
faction of the former Lebanese army - the Lebanese Arab Army
under Lt
.
Khatib. Though lacking in discipline and now more
of a militia than an army, this force is nonetheless well armed
and has been closely associated with several Palestinian fac-
tions. The second group, the Movement of the Deprived under
Imam Mousa Al Sadr, has united a large portion of the Shia
community, whose economic plight certainly qualifies them as
being deprived. Imam Sadr's leadership has won him a great
following among the Moslem religious community. Originally a
moderate leader, Imam Sadr was no sooner elected head of the
Muslim Higher Council when Israeli raids on Palestinian commando
camps in southern Lebanon began causing civilian causalties in
this predominantly Shia inhabited area. As Shia refugees began
pouring north into Beirut to avoid the fighting in the south Sadr
eventually came to encourage his followers to take up arms in
order to defend themselves. Unfortunately, Imam Sadr disappeared
51

under suspicious circumstances after a visit to Libya in
October 1978 - his fate still uncertain. 57 Following the
example of Sadr, two other moderate Moslem political leaders,
Rashid Karami and Saib Salam, are now also reputed to have
recruited private militias for their organizations - the
58Arab Liberation Party and the Pioneers of Reform respectively.
A final Lebanese faction, which basically defies
categorization and is affiliated with the National Movement,
is the Front of Patriotic Christians (FPC). This organization
was established in the wake of the civil war fighting in
September 1976 in reaction to the then prevalent international
press depiction of the Christian community in Lebanon as
being totally allied to or in agreement with the rightist
Lebanese Front. Although the FPC does not ascribe to the
leftist ideologies prevalent in the National Movement, it is
in agreement with the Transitional Program as the only means
of bringing internal peace and stability to the country. They
explain their aims thus:
The predominantly Christian right-wing parties, by
presenting themselves as the defenders of Christianity
in Lebanon, had all along sought to give a religious
coloring to the underlying conflict between the"haves"
and "have nots."
Libian authorities claim Sadr was aboard an airliner which
departed Libya for Beirut. Mysteriously, however, the Imam
was not among the passengers when the aircraft landed in
Beirut. Responsibility for the kidnapping (if one ever
occurred) was never announced. See Arab Report and Record ,
No. 18, (.16-31 October 1978).
Keesing's Contemporary Archives , p. 27767.
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The goal of the FPC is diametrically opposed to the
right wing goal. The "Patriotic Christians" seek to
demonstrate that in foregoing special privileges through
the secularization of government, Lebanese Christians
will not suffer the fate of an oppressed minority. At
the same time, they can ally themselves with the Muslim
majority in the Arab world in support of social change
and against foreign domination. 5^
The FPC also, however, points out a failure of the National
Movement's Transitional program regarding the Christian
minority, in that "it has not yet provided a democratic secu-
lar solution to the question of national, ethnic and religious
minorities." The FPC has no militia, which in Lebanon's
current situation limits its ability to exert its identity
and position. Nevertheless, it is emerging as a growing
political force for those Christians who wish to express
opposition to the rightist Lebanese Front.
C. THE PALESTINIANS
Added to the conglomeration of internal factions operating
on the Lebanese scene are the Palestinian groups under the
umbrella Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), created in
1964. As Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee (since 1969),
Commander in Chief of the PLO's Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
and leader of the national liberation (commando) movement Fateh,
Yasser Arafat exerts loose control over a majority of the
armed Palestinians in Lebanon. Made up of former Palestinian
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brigades of the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi armies,
the PLA now maintains a majority of its members in Lebanon.
Since the PLA was designed and dedicated to the fight to regain
Palestine from the Zionists, Arafat tried (somewhat unsuccess-
fully) to keep this force out of the 1976 civil war fighting -
initially supporting the Syrian intervention. Keeping such
large numbers of armed units both discrete and uninvolved in
the conflict has proven quite difficult. The distinction be-
tween the PLA forces and the armed militias of Fateh, both
under Arafat's command, has become quite blurred. As Tarbush
explains
:
After the Jordanian civil war in September 1970, Fateh
set up the Yarmouq Brigade, mainly from Palestinians
who had left the Jordanian army. Though often described
as part of the PLA, the brigade is actually part of
Fateh and directly controlled by Arafat . "61
Also included in this establishment wing of the PLO is the
Palestinian Armed Struggle Command, formed in 1969, which
attempts to coordinate activities of the guerrilla groups
while also functioning as a police force in the Palestinian
refugee camps.
The dissident element of the Palestinian groups is
represented by the Rejectionist Front, which interestingly
enough also includes the Christian Palestinian leadership
elements. These groups broke away from the leadership of
Arafat (and the PLO) in September 1974 and operate independently
61Tarbush, "The Divided Front", p. 614
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and often in opposition among themselves. Largest of these is
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which
grew out of the Arab National Movement of the early 1950s and
was originally organized under the leadership of George Habash,
Wadei Haddad, and Ahmed Jibril in 1967. Not a particularly
tight knit group, the original PFLP would eventually split into
separate groups under these three leaders. Haddad' s breakaway
faction, the PFLP "Special Operations Branch" (which actually
operated independent of the PFLP) was created in 1972 and
dissolved after Haddad' s death in March 1976, after having
claimed responsibility for international terrorist attacks
62
such as the Entebbe hijacking. Jibril 's breakaway faction,
which split from the PFLP in 1968, was called the PFLP - General
Command. Also, another group of leftist dissidents under Nayef
Hawatma split from the PFLP in 1969 forming the Popular
Democratic Front (PDFLP). Finally, the PFLP-GC again frag-
mented with the breakaway of the Palestine Liberation Front
(PLF) under Abu Abbas in April 1977. Divided over Syrian in-
tervention in Lebanon "the two factions have since been in-
volved in many clashes particularly in Sidon." Rounding out
the Palestinian groups active in Lebanon Saiqa, the Palestinian
62Haddad, a Palestinian Christian, was one of the leading
proponents of bringing international attention to the
Palestinian cause by worldwide hijacking and terrorism. He
was reputed to have connections with such international terrorist
groups as "the Japanese Red Army, the West German Red Army
Faction and the international terrorist Ilich Ramirez





commando wing of the Syrian Army, and the Arab Liberation
Front (ALF), a similar unit of the Iraqi Army must also be
64included. The true alliegances of these units are an
interesting question.
A rather apt description of the effects of the
Palestinian presence on the Lebanese is provided by Patrick
Seale:
Because they were waging a revolution; because they
were disinherited; because they overturned the authority
of the state and the social structure in the south;
because, finally, they inflamed nationalist opinion
against the state's impotence, the Palestinians were
the most radical and radicalizing force in Lebanese
society. In their orbit grew up, satellite fashion,
other centres of radicalism: Nasserist street gangs
recruited from among the urban Sunni proletariat
disclaiming alliegance to the Sunni notables; uprooted
Shia peasants driven from their southern villages
by Israeli retaliatory raids to swell the shanty town
population around Beirut; front organizations of the
Communist Party, embracing students, teachers, women
and workers, mobilized by the party in defense of the
Palestinians and against the established order; and,
to the left of the communists, a number of small but
highly influential extremist pressure groups, such as
the Organization For Communist Action, which provided
the inchoate mass of the disinherited with slogans,
fighting issues and leadership . ^5
Palestinian infusion into the Lebanese political scene is
yet another example of the influence they can exert in the
country. As Hudson points out:
There is little doubt that groups like the PFLP took an
active part in Lebanese politics and certainly supported
the reform program of the National Movement which called
for an end to, or at least a diminution of, Maronite
preponderance and socio-economic "injustice" . 66
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It is difficult to say how the Lebanese political crisis might
change should this Palestinian influence be removed. For
the Moslem Lebanese element, this Palestinian-Lebanese left
collaboration certainly has both positive and negative im-
plications in solving Lebanon's present situation.
57

IV. THE EXTERNAL ACTORS
The role of the external actors on the Lebanese scene is
both extensive and controversial. Although some countries
have chosen to play their role in passive rather than active
means, their effects are no less relevant. For it is the
arming and bankrolling of the different armed Lebanese and
Palestinian factions that makes a continuation of the conflict
not only possible but inevitable. Still, many of these ex-
ternal actors are beginning to realize that a solution to the
Lebanese Crisis is necessary in order to promote greater
regional stability and economic development. The problem re-
mains that neither maintaining the status quo (Maronite
ascendancy) or a triumph of the Palestinian supported Lebanese
left appears as a viable solution to the Lebanese impasse.
This is why particularly Lebanon's "frontline" neighboring
states - Israel and Syria - tend to react so strongly to
apparent shifts in Lebanon's sectarian power balance.
A. ISRAEL'S POSITION
It is far too simple an explanation to ascribe reasons of
national security to Israel's involvement in Lebanon. With
the armed Palestinian commando units in the south of course
this is a consideration, but there are other reasons for
their support of the Christian militias. Not only is there
a Western cultural bond between the Israelis and Lebanese
Christians, but there is also a shared historical deterministic
view of the survival of their societal group. For the Israelis,
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the Lebanese Christians represent a fellow religious minority
sect in a predominantly Arab-Islamic religious and cultural
area. Thus the survival of one is linked to the other. The
comment is made that Israel no longer fears being thrown into
the Mediterranean Sea by the Arabs but rather being drowned
in the "sea of Islam". This observation holds true no less
for the Lebanese Christians.
Also, for the Israelis, any armed conflict between
Christians and Palestinians in Lebanon certainly serves to
divert attention from the Palestinian's main espoused opponent.
However, in support of Palestinian aims, Moslem Lebanese
opinion of Israel's interests in Lebanon most likely falls in
line with Tarbush's statement that:
Many Lebanese believe that Israel is intent on modifying
its northern border and creating a buffer zone like
those between it and Egypt (Sinai), Jordan (the West
Bank) and Syria (Golan). It is suspected that Israel
has long cherished the idea of a Christian "statelet"
in the south closely allied to Israel which would
both aid Israel's security and mean Israel was no
longer the only confessionally-based state in the
area. Israel is also thought to have designs on the
waters of the Litani.^ 7
Israel's policy could easily be interpreted as building not
just walls but impenetrable barriers along its borders.
If this were the case, Israel's Lebanese border, where a
majority of the Palestinian terrorist raids infiltrate
Israeli defenses, would certainly be the place they would
want such a barrier. Barriers, however, cause isolation as
well as protection - a consideration the Israelis must also make
6 7Susannan Tarbush, "Lebanon - A Sinister Calm", Arab Report ,
(February 14, 1979), p. 8.
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The Lebanese civilian casualties which have been in-
flicted by Israeli retaliatory raids into southern Lebanon,
of course, are the main point of contention in this Israeli
policy as far as the Lebanese government is concerned.
Although Lebanese acceptance of the armed Palestinian presence,
in Israel's view, makes them liable for these side effects,
this way of looking at things certainly does not help the
Lebanese regime's attempts to assert its authority. As
Koury explains:
Israel could not tolerate increasing and continuous
commando attacks without retaliation, but whatever the
logic of Israeli military policy, constant Israeli
retaliations against Lebanon could only have intensified
anti-Israeli sentiment. ^8
At the same time, there were also anti-Syrian designs
in Israeli policy on south Lebanon. Despite the fact that
it remained non-reactive to Syria's intervention in the
1976 civil war fighting, Israel did make it clear that the
extent of southern action of Syrian units which would be
tolerated without response by Israel was the "red line"
just north of the Litani mentioned earlier. Since the Syrian
ADF was stationed in Lebanon, Israel in turn has generally
confined its incursions into southern Lebanon to south of
this line, along which the UNIFIL forces are stationed.
It can be surmised, however, that Syrian actions in Lebanon
are closely watched by the Israelis. According to Koury:
"Frequent Israeli official statements have suggested that
Israel would not remain idle while Syrian forces overthrew
68





the confessional government of Lebanon." 69
The most recent Israeli raids against Palestinian camps
in southern Lebanon confirm Israel's pragmatic and unchanging
policy. The inability of the U.S. (Israel's chief arms
supplier) to apply coercive leverage in order to affect a
modification of this policy does not bode well for Lebanon.
Clearly, until the violence can be curtailed, no hope for
mediation can be held. And yet,
Begin has declared his intention of continuing to
combat the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a matter
of policy and not only in retaliation for guerrilla
operations inside Israel. Moreover, Israel had shown
no sign of falling in with U.S. plans in the area. 70
This escalation of Israeli military policy with respect to
southern Lebanon has ominous implications for both the
Lebanese crisis and the Middle East peace process initiated
by the Camp David accords, as will be discussed in Section VI
B. SYRIAN INTERESTS
Syria's continued armed presence in Lebanon, under the
Arab League ADF sanction, is equally foreboding for Lebanon's
future. Syria is equally opposed to either a partitioned
Lebanon (for fear of a pro-Israeli Christian ministate)
or to a radical overthrow of the existing government and the
emergence of a leftist regime. What Syria does want is less
clear. At this point, its hegemony over Lebanese affairs is
apparent in that:
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The major decisions about Lebanon's defense, foreign
policy, and national integrity are now made in
Damascus, not Beirut, and it is there that the
squabbles which periodically flare up between the
still unreconciled factions are settled. 71
Regardless of the credibility of the supposed Syrian desire
to unite greater Syria (.the entire French mandated territory
including Lebanon), and even if the Arab League is bankrolling
the ADF presence, this must still be somewhat of a burden
to Syria, both economically and militarily.
On a more pragmatic level, Syria has always had close
links with Lebanon and is interested in its continued
viability for several reasons. First of all, transportation
routes to Damascus, Syria's capital, are much more modern
and convenient directly west to Lebanon's major ports of
Beirut and Tripoli rather than north to the more remote
Syrian ports. Syria has continually tried to increase economic
ties with Lebanon, going so far as to propose an economic
union. Syria would no doubt like to benefit in some degree
from Lebanon's position as the banking and financial center
of the Middle East, particularly considering the cost in-
curred to Syria by maintaining the ADF in Lebanon.
Having intervened in 1976 on behalf of the Christians
and against the leftists and Palestinians, and then in 1978
against the Christians Cand thus in a pro-Palestinian/leftist
stance), the Syrians have been accused of duplicity and a
policy of preserving the standoff between the opposing
71Seale, "Lebanon", p. 253.
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Lebanese groups. One explanation of the Syrian actions
contends
:
Just as Syria could not allow the leftist-Palestinian
alliance to triumph in 1976, so in 1978 the Maronites
in turn had to be brought to heel. Like Kamal Junblatt
before them, the hardline Maronite leaders, such as
Beshir Gemayel and Camille Chamoun misjudged the
regional context of their local bid for power. They
failed to recognize that Syria and the states behind it
could not let them win. 72
At the same time, a well founded concern for Israeli designs
also affects Syrian strategy. As Seale again explains:
"The fear of being drawn into a war with Israel at a time
not of its choosing has always been the underlying logic
of Syria's intervention in Lebanon and of its continued
73presence there."
It appears that Syria would prefer to keep the Arab
confrontation with Israel, which it supports, on neutral
ground and carried out through the Palestinian commandos
in south Lebanon, with various local forces as a buffer
between Israeli forces and the ADF, rather than on the
Golan Heights. Thus it sees its security as tied to the
continued ADF presence in Lebanon both economically and
militarily if not politically. In one view:
Syrian armed presence in Lebanon is governed by internal
and regional considerations which prevent any change
in connection with this presence, at least for the
time being. This would have direct repercussions on the
72An Nahar Report and Memo , Vol. 2, No. 30, July 24, 1978.
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domestic scene in Syria as well as on the Syrian
position in connection with the Arab-Israeli
conflict. 74
These vested interests explain Syria's stake in the outcome
of the Lebanese crisis. Syria's anti-Western (U.S.) posture
and self-appointed leadership of the Arab Rejectionist
Front (opposed to the Camp David accords) complicates the
situation further from the U.S. perspective.
As for the other Middle Eastern countries of the Arab
League, their role in the Lebanese impasse, although more
clear cut and direct, is less effective. Among the more
radical states, Libya, Iraq and Syria all supported the
Palestinian and leftist Lebanese factions both financially
and militarily, and most assuredly Libya and Iraq continue
this role today. Other Arab nations fall more in line with
the objectives of the Syrian ADF presence, as Koury states:
There are some Arab countries (notably Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) which for various
reasons - remote geographic location, ideological
conservatism, national interest - wish to put an end
to the civil strife and to preserve the state of Lebanon.
Their overriding goal is to keep the balancing process
intact and their tactics simply involve the use of
their power to maintain the Lebanese political equi-
librium without destroying the competing communes and
sub-communes . ^5
Saudi Arabia, with its petrodollar surplus, has actually
been accused of bankrolling the Syrian ADF while aiding
both Lebanese factions plus the Palestinians - quite a
duplicity of policy. However, Saudi diplomatic initiatives
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have been instrumental in accomplishing the ceasefires and
truces which ended the civil war fighting in 1976 and 1978,
illustrating their degree of influence over the opposing fac-
tions. This was accomplished despite the coolness of Saudi-
Palestinian relations. Also, other moderate Arab regimes
with Palestinian refugee communities are said to harbor
Palestinian sympathies. In a more recent development, indi-
cations of a Palestinian-Jordanian rapproachement are now
beginning to appear as well.
C. THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R - HESITANT SPECTATORS
For various reasons, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have
been reluctant to become directly involved in the Lebanese
Crisis from 1975 to the present. For the U.S. this lack of
initiative on the Lebanese issue stems from the U.S. commitment
to the security of Israel and the U.S. preoccupation with the
initial negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords
(beginning in late 1977) and subsequent policy initiatives
in the area aimed at keeping the Middle East peace process
alive. Also, the fact that U.S. mediation was not particularly
desired by at least some factions in the Lebanese internal
dispute was underscored by the unfortunate assasination of
According to one source, shortly after a historic meeting
between PLO leader Arafat and Jordan's King Husain, a commando
raid was conducted, for the first time in four years, into
Israel from Jordan. A Palestinian Liberation Army unit is
also reported to be stationed again in Jordan. See "New
Front Seen Emerging Within the PLO As A Result of Fatah 's
Conflict With Libya and Rapproachement With Jordan", The
Arab World Weekly , No. 545, Devember 29, 1979, p. 20.
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the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut in July 1976 while on a peace
77
envoy mission. U.S. relations with Lebanon are no doubt
still tempered by this event. The U.S. is also accused by
the Palestinians and leftist Lebanese of providing Israel
with anti-personnel and other sophisticated armaments (which
also find their way into the hands of the Christian militias)
used in the raids on the south and thus resulting in
Palestinian and Lebanese civilian deaths.
Only recently has the U.S. come to realize that the
ultimate fate of its Middle East peace initiatives may lie
in the Lebanese impasse and more specifically in the
Palestinian-Lebanese linkage. Still, the U.S. position on
Lebanon remains basically one of rhetorical support, as
witnessed by former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young's address
before the U.N. Security Council on August 29, 1979.
The U.S. government's policy on Lebanon is well known:
we support that country's sovereignty, independence,
unity and territorial integrity. We have special ties
of sympathy with the people of Lebanon, and we have
supported the government of President Sarkis in its
efforts to restore its authority throughout the
country - including throughout southern Lebanon. ^8
Continuing on to condemn both Palestinian and Israeli
raiding policies, the statement calls for a "complete,
77See The Assasination of American Diplomats in Beirut , Lebanon
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immediate and lasting halt to all shelling, terrorism and
other acts of violence", words which have no doubt been
reiterated by President Sarkis and other Lebanese officials
to little avail. This latest statement of U.S. policy
toward Lebanon gives no commitment to come to the aid of the
state in any future difficulty or danger of destruction.
However, a recent PLO call for a curtailment of guerrilla
activities in south Lebanon has provided the opportunity
for a new U.S. initiative in the area. This new U.S.
initiative will be discussed in Section VI.
The Soviet interest and involvement in the Lebanese
Crisis has been complicated by the triangular relationship
between the USSR, Syria and the Palestinians. Apparently
the Soviets have decided to focus their support for the
Palestinians rather than the Lebanese leftists (.Communist)
groups as their best bet of retaining influence in the
area. According to Kass
:
The USSR's initial reluctance to commit itself to
the leftists' cause appears consistent with its
traditionally cautious approach to insurgent movements
which have yet to demonstrate their cohesiveness
,
viability and, most importantly, their functional
value to Moscow's own interests. 79
The split of the Marxist rejectionist wing from the PLO
must no doubt have made Moscow question the cohesiveness
of the Palestinian National Movement (PNM) which they hoped
would provide their leverage in the Lebanese situation.
79 liana Kass, "Moscow and the Lebanese Triangle", The Middle
East Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1979), p. 166.
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To a degree both Moscow and Syria have been frustrated in
their attempts to exercise control over the PNM to their
advantage.
It follows th-en, that the most favorable situation for
both Syria and the Soviets would have been one where their
interests and influences coincided with respect to the
Lebanese crisis and particularly the Palestinians in Lebanon.
This clearly was not the case, however, in the aftermath
of the Syrian military move into Lebanon in June 1976. When
the Syrian troops went into action against the Palestinian-
leftist alliance, this put the Soviets in the middle, between
the Syrians and the PLO, where a decision to take one side
over the other was clearly a no win situation. As Kass explains
The choice between Syria and the PLO was, indeed, a
difficult one. For an open rift with Damascus was
bound to send Asad closer to the Americans, endangering
thereby the entire Soviet Middle East strategy and
leaving Moscow with unstable Iraq as the only pro-
Soviet confrontation state. On the other hand, the
USSR could not afford to abandon the PLO without imperiling
its image as the patron of national liberation
movements and consequently, its standing with the
Third World nations. 8
After attempting unsuccessfully to placate the Palestinians
(promising renewed support) and to exert pressure on the
Syrians to withdraw their ADF forces, the Soviets eventually
vacillated. For fear of losing its remaining regional client
the Soviets could hope for no more than to maintain its
cm
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relationship with Syria via quiet acquiescence. As Stiefbold
explains
:
The Soviet Union's limited leverage over Syria in
the Lebanese debacle points up the extent to which its
policy options have been circumscribed in the Middle
East. After the costly injury to Soviet prestige and
influence inflicted by the Egyptian rupture, Moscow
could not afford a permanent breach with its Syrian
client. 81
This left the Soviets to again reassess its policy pursuits
in the area in a situation where it had been proven to
exercise little control.
Moscow's subsequent policy for this portion of the
Middle East, which related directly to the situation in
Lebanon, was to call for a resumption of the all party
Geneva Middle East Peace talks as an alternative to the
Camp David initiatives. However, with its influence among
the more important actors in the region limited to only a
few states (Syria, Iraq and Libya) the chances of this
eventuality are limited to perhaps only the aftermath of
another Middle East war. Also the Soviets do not have any
influence or leverage over Israel, an important actor in
the area and thus an important plus for any U.S. initiatives.
Soviet influence in the area, then, remains incumbent on
their ability to play the Syrian-Palestinian relationship.
As Kass points out
:
The fragile entente between Damascus and the PRM,
while offering no solutions to the numerous problems
which produced Lebanon's civil strike, effectively
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removed the one dimension of the conflict that
aroused Moscow's interest and concern. ^2
It can be safely stated then, that Moscow's interests are
of little concern to either the Palestinians, the Lebanese
left or the Syrians with respect to the actions each sees
as necessary for their survival or security interests.
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V. CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON
There were only losers in the Lebanese civil war.
So shameful were the atrocities, so terrible the death
toll, so finally inconclusive the contest, that Lebanese
of all factions either strive to forget the whole
affair or are at pains to justify their part in it, at
least on the grounds of community survival. Whatever
regime finally establishes itself, whether strongly
centralized or, as in the past, a reflection of
Lebanese diversity, the war has left each community
sharply aware of its separateness and pondering its
identity . 83
The two periods of civil war fighting in Lebanon in
1975-1976 and again in 1978 were, in actuality, only more
intensified segments of violence and internecine conflict
which have characterized the country since 1974. The
destruction and devastation this warfare has brought to the
country, particularly the hotel district in Beirut and the
refugee camps on its outskirts, is difficult to imagine.
Yet, the basic issues which led to these outbreaks remain
by and large unresolved and to a certain extent further
complicated by the situation in the south and the ineffec-
tiveness of the Lebanese army in separating the opposing
factions and restoring order. However, if the sectarian
tension in the country may be considered as providing the
foundation of the civil war, the presence of the armed,
radical rejectionist Palestinian groups may be considered
as the catalyst to violence. Also, the inability of the
PLO leadership to curtail Palestinian involvement in the
fighting played its part in the continuation of the war
83Seale, "Lebanon", p. 255
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beyond the early truces. At the same time, certain factions
of both the right and left wanted to keep the Palestinians
in the fighting for their own separate purposes. Even the
Syrians, after their intervention, would end up changing
their support for the Lebanese protagonists over the course
of the 1975-1976 and 1978 civil war phases. In the end,
it can only be said that a precarious balance has been
restored among the Lebanese factions and the Palestinians,
with the Syrian ADF providing internal order and some degree
of security. Or as one analyst puts it, after all the
recent fighting "Lebanon is back to square one." In getting
nowhere, however, a violent game is being played by the
Lebanese and Palestinians - which shows little sign of ending.
A. THE 1975-1976 CIVIL WAR
Two significant events are generally felt to have pro-
vided the initial impetus to the escalation of fighting
in Lebanon to civil war proportions in 1975. The first of
these was a strike in late Feburary 1975 in the port of
Saida by Moslem fishermen who were protesting the government's
establishment of a concession for a high technology fishing
company called Protein - owned in part, interestingly
84
enough, by the Chamoun family. Lebanese army units
dispatched to control the protest ended up firing on the




crowd, killing several protestors including Sunni leader
Marouf Saad. Demonstrations and a general strike by
Moslem Lebanese, encouraged by the rejectionist Palestinians
and the Lebanese leftists, quickly led to a governmental
crisis. The initiation of serious violence, however,
commenced with the Phalangist attack on a bus carrying
rejectionist Palestinians from a protest demonstration on
8613 April, killing 27. After this incident, fighting
quickly spread between Phalangist and Palestinian factions
in Beirut and around the Palestinian refugee camps on
Beirut's outskirts. Despite efforts by Syrian Foreign
Minister Khaddam and PLO leader Arafat to negotiate a
ceasefire, this Phalangist-Palestinian fighting continued
from April through August 1975, eventually spreading beyond
the Beirut area to other towns where there were both Christian
and Palestinian leftist militias present - notably Tripoli
in the north and Zahle in the Bekaa valley.
These Phalangist-Palestinian clashes from April through
June 1975 are generally regarded as the first of four phases
of the war. The second phase began when the Lebanese leftist
forces were drawn in against the rightist militias as the
fighting spread throughout the country. As Hudson explains:
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The second phase extended from June through December.
In this period the Palestinian role was relatively
reduced while the dispute between the Maronite-
rightists and Muslim-leftists took on greater
importance. This stage began with President Franjiyyah's
abortive attempt to form an all military Cabinet, thus
provoking a storm of Muslim and leftist protest, while
at the same time Arafat was concluding yet another
agreement with Franjiyyah and other Lebanese leaders
to try and remove the Palestinians from the fray. 87
After a relative lull in the fighting in July, renewed
clashes occurred in several towns including Zghorta (home
of Franjiyyeh) and Tripoli in August and September. Under
great pressure from both Franjiyyeh and Public Works Minister
Chamoun, Lebanese Prime Minister Karami reluctantly ordered
Lebanese army units sent to these two towns on September 12 -
eliciting strong leftist protest. This brought Christian-
rightist/Moslem-leftist fighting again to Beirut, where
repeated calls for ceasefires by the Lebanese government,
Syria and the PLO were ignored by the militias. In the
meantime, leftist units began firing on the predominantly
Christian Lebanese army units deployed to Tripoli. On
October 24 Lebanese army units were also positioned in
Beirut in an attempt to restore order.
Next, two events occurred amidst the daily battles in
Beirut which were to have substantial effects on the
continuation of the fighting. The first of these occurred
in late October when the Beirut fighting escalated over into
88
the international "hotel district", causing the evacuation
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of foreign embassy staffs and businessmen and the closing
of many banks and businesses. This caused not only dis-
ruption of the economic activities in the country but also
led to the dismissal of the Chamber of Deputies and a
general breakdown of the government bureaucracy as well.
Many well-to-do Lebanese fled the country as the civil war
violence spread. The Lebanese Cabinet itself was forced
to meet at various locations after even the President's house
came under attack. Although the Cabinet agreed to accept
a French offer to attempt mediation of the crisis, the
Prime Minister still refused to order the army to fully
deploy and enforce the now 12th ceasefire which had
been declared and gone unheeded.
In a desperate reconciliation attempt, a National
Dialogue Committee consisting of the leaders of the various
factions met in November, but Maronite leaders Chamoun and
Gemayel boycotted the meeting, which quickly deadlocked.
In Beirut and other towns, indiscriminate kidnappings and
murders by one faction against the other began to occur.
To add to the confusion, Israeli jets flew over Beirut in
November and on December 2 bombed and straffed a Palestinian
89
camp in the south, killing nearly 100.
The second escalating event was the arrival of 200
Syrian-Palestinian Saiqa commando troops in Tripoli in
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Lebanese army units in maintaining order. The Maronite
leaders, however, tended to regard this first overt military
move by Syria as an attempt to take advantage of the civil
disturbances in order to annex this northern portion of
91Lebanon. Regardless of their original intent, these
Saiqa units soon went into action with the Lebanese leftists
against the Phalangist militias as the fighting wore on
despite the Lebanese army presence. Meanwhile, President
Franjiyyeh's son Tony was hastily organizing the Zghorta
Liberation Army in nearby Ehden , soon joining the
Phalangists in the area fighting.
Fighting intensified in Beirut in December after the
"Black Saturday" incident on December 6 in which Phalangist
gunmen rounded up and randomly murdered 200 Moslems in
retaliation for the murder of 4 Phalangists the previous
92day. Leftist militias answered this atrocity by pressing
an attack on the Christian held hotel district of Beirut
and succeeded in overrunning the St. Georges Hotel on 7
December and attacking the Phalangist fall back positions
of the Holiday Inn. By December 17 the stalemate in the
hotel district had caused a lull in the fighting in Beirut,
but fighting continued in Zahle and Tripoli, where Lebanese
army units and Palestinian militias were now doing battle.










Possibilities of a hastily administered political reform
program to placate the Moslem leftists arose with the lull
in the Beirut fighting, but it was clear that the Christian
factions were in no mood for concessions. Unable to make
advances in the hotel district, the Phalangists chose instead
to lay siege to Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of
Beirut - notably the Tel Zaatar camp. According to Salibi:
Following the bombardment and destruction of the central
parts of Beirut, the Kata f ib militia, joined by a whole
array of other Maronite militias - the P.N.L. al-Numur
(Tigers), the militia of the Maronite League, the
armed band called Hurras al-Arz (Cedar Guards), and
others - actually proceeded to escalate the fighting
on all fronts surrounding Beirut, apparently with the
intent of forcing Karami either to yield and bring
out the Army, or else to resign. 93
The Phalangist attacks on the Palestinian camps, which
to the Maronites represented potential enemy enclaves in
otherwise Maronite areas, initiated the third phase of the
civil war, which went from December 1975 until the intervention
of regular Syrian Army units in June 1976. The Phalangist
assaults on the Palestinian camps reinstigated widespread
fighting throughout Lebanon, as leftist and Palestinian units
counterattacked against Christian strongholds. The
deployment of Lebanese Air Force units against Palestinian
and leftist forces operation south of Beirut, despite the
protests of Karami, led to the Prime Minister's threat of
resignation on 18 January. Also on this date, Palestinian





Liberation Army units were dispatched to Lebanon from Syria
in an attempt to break the seige of the refugee camps. The
situation rapidly deteriorating, the Palestinian camps of
Karantina and Maslakh were overrun by rightist forces on
January 21 while progressive forces on the same day captured
the Christian town of Damour in the south.
During the next few months, the leftist-Palestinian
coalition began to gain an upper hand in the fighting
against the Maronite militias. Now another event - the
defection of the Lebanese Arab Array under Lt . Khatib from
the ranks of the Lebanese Army to join the progressives -
further endangered the defensive Maronite-rightist posture.
As if things were not bad enough for the beleagured
Lebanese government, after Christian remnants of the
Lebanese Army began deserting to joint the militias fighting
to defend their home villages (completing the disintegration
of the army), General Ahdab , Commander of the Beirut Garrison,
on March 11 declared a state of emergency in Lebanon,
himself the military governor of the state and called for
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the resignation of President Franjiyyeh. Meanwhile
fighting had resumed in Beirut, with the progressives
reinforced by Lebanese Arab Army armored units capturing the
96
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A short truce during the first part of April was
partially observed as the opposing forces at this point
remained stalemated. Announcements of candidacy by Elias
Sarkis and Raymond Edde for the July Presidential election
were made, while President Franjiyyeh, despite calls for
his resignation, remained determined to serve until the
completion of his term in September. The PLO announced a
7 point peace plan in order that peaceful elections might
be held. But the rumors of the movement of advanced units
of the Syrian Army (3 miles over the Lebanese border) on
April 9 led to first demonstrations and protest followed
predictably by violence. Heavy fighting continued into
May, with the addition of heavy artillery and mortar shelling
being traded by the opposing groups in Beirut. Fighting
intensified through May after a short lull during Sarkis'
election to the presidency on May 8. By now confirmation of
the presence of regular Syrian Army units in Lebanon led
not only to Lebanese rightist-leftist fighting but also to
Syrian backed Saiqa-Iraqi backed Arab Liberation Front
Palestinian clashes, as well as those between Saiqa and
Fateh units.
The introduction of 5000 Syrian Army troops into
Lebanon, with 2000 going to the beseiged Christian north
and 3000 proceeding along the Damascus highway toward Beirut
on 31 May and 1 June, initiated the fourth and final
phase of the 1976 civil war. Interestingly enough, the
Saiqa units, upon the full scale Syrian intervention, quickly
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changed sides and clashed with Lebanese leftist forces on
June 6. This same day, the PLO accused the Syrian forces
of firing on Palestinian camps east of Beirut. It quickly
became clear that the Syrian intervention was designed to
break the leftist-Palestinian alliance and come to the aid
of the beleagured Christians. In response to international
concerns, on June 13 the Syrian Information Minister announced
that the rapidly deploying Syrian force would remain in
Lebanon until the administration of president-elect Sarkis
97
was installed.
A hastily called Arab League Summit came out in support
of Syria, and several countries promised to send troops to
augment the Arab Deterrent Force (as this legitimization of
Syria's intervention was called). Violence in Lebanon con-
tinued through July as N.L.P. militias instigated another
siege on the Palestinian Tel Zaatar camp and in response
Lebanese Arab Army units shelled Christian sections of Junieh
and other leftist factions struck at other Christian areas and
towns. Christian commanders refused to both allow ADF forces
to take up their positions surrounding Tel Zaatar or to let
International Red Cross representatives into the camp, as the
stalemate continued. The ADF, even with reinforcements of
small Libyan, Saudi Arabian and Sudanese units, was unable to
separate the fighting factions. An agreement reached between
Syria and the PLO on July 22 (The Damascus Agreement) achieved
little, since the Christian militias now chose to press an
advantage.
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On August 12, 1976 The Palestinian camp of Tel Zaatar
was overrun by the Christian militias after a renewed
assault. The offensive, however, did not end there.
Following the fall of Tal Zataar, Christian and Syrian
forces took the offensive in several parts of the
country, apparently attempting to drive Palestinian
and leftist forces into certain defined areas and to
cut their lines of communication and supply. By mid-
August some press reports put the total strength of Syrian
forces in the country at 20,000 (including the Syrian
contingent in the pan-Arab peace keeping force), in
addition to which, units of the Syrian-sponsored
"Vanguards of the Lebanese Army' f were deployed in
southern Lebanon, particularly around the Moslem town
of Nabatiyah. 98
After these setbacks it appeared that the Lebanese leftists
were ready to reluctantly fall back and regroup - perhaps
even stop fighting. The Palestinian units, however, wished
to avenge the fall of Tel Zaatar, and fighting continued
in the Shuf region east of Beirut until another agreement
was reached between the PLO and the Syrians on September 11.
A truce, generally observed throughout the country,
was called for the innauguration of President Sarkis on
September 23 - which took place, for security reasons, in
Syrian controlled territory east of Beirut in the town of
Chtaura. In his innauguration speech, Sarkis pleaded for
an end to the fighting, promised social and economic reform
and to consider restructure of the government, announced
plans for the restoration of security, and reassured the
Palestinians of a pro-Arab Lebanese stance. Fighting
between Syrian, Christian and Palestinian/leftist forces
98Keesing r s Contemporary Archives , December 31, 1976. p. 28120
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unfortunately broke out again on September 28. Faced with
the combined Syrian/Christian strength, however, the
Palestinians and Lebanese leftists lost ground on all fronts.
Finally on October 16, 1976 the Riyadh Agreement, mediated
by Saudi Arabia, was reached by Lebanese, Syrian and PLO
representatives along with- those of Egypt and Kuwait.
The plan signed in Riyadh on October 18 provided inter
alia for (i) the creation of a 30,000 man Arab "deterrent"
force (as against the existing "security" contingent
of 2,500 men) which would be under the control of
President Sarkis and would be equipped with heavy
weapons and armour, Cii) a definite ceasefire throughout
Lebanon starting from October 21, followed by a
withdrawal of all Lebanese combatants to the positions
they held before April 1975, and (iii) full observance
by the PLO of the 1969 Cairo Agreement regulating the
presence of Palestinians in Lebanon. ^9
Although some isolated fighting continued after Riyadh, the
Syrian ADF forces moved into many of the disputed areas in
the country (including Beirut) and relative calm was restored
by late November.
It is estimated that 40-60,000 Lebanese and Palestinians
were killed during these 20 months of civil war with an
additional 100,000 wounded. Physical destruction and
economic upheaval in the country were astronomical as well.
Yet, it should be noted that the provisions of the Riyadh
Agreement ending the war seemed to deal more than anything
else with the Palestinians, with no mention of the issues
still dividing the Lebanese Moslems and Christians. Plus
Keesing's Contemporary Archives , p. 28122.
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the situation for the new Lebanese government of President
Sarkis was such that internal security in the country was
in the hands of an outside military force, the ADF, supposedly
under his command. These conditions did not particularly
please many of the Lebanese factions nor did they appear very
stable to one outside observer - Israel. It was obvious
Lebanon's crisis, though dormant, was nowhere near resolved.
B. THE 1978 CIVIL WAR
The atmosphere of tension in Lebanon was far from slackened
in the aftermath of the 1976 war. In early 1977, sporadic
violence still occurred as the Palestinian militias moved
to the south and clashed with the Christian forces stationed
there, and as Christian militia units in Beirut continued
to show defiance of the ADF forces which they now wished to
leave the country. Throughout 1977 isolated incidents con-
tinued to occur showing that the situation in Lebanon had
changed little. On March 16, 1977 Druze leader Kamal Junblatt
was assasinated, which led to the now all too familiar
revenge killings characteristic of Lebanon's social disorder.
Fighting in the Shuf region continued though August as Christian
and Druze militias clashed in the mountain home area of both
the Junblatt and Chamoun families. Even the deployment of
Syrian ADF troops into the region could not bring an end to
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these battles. This move led instead to further Christian-
ADF clashes in Beirut
.
In the south fighting intensified between Palestinian
forces and Christian militias who wanted the Palestinians
(as well as the ADF) out of the country. Israeli units be-
gan operating in conjunction with the Christian forces,
lending artillery and occasional air support from northern
Israel and crossing the border for short hit and run raids.
The Palestinians responded by conducting rocket attacks on
Israeli border towns, refusing to give up their bases in
the south. Throughout November and December these incidents
began to increase in both frequency and intensity. On
December 22, "Secretary General of the National Liberal
Party Dory Shamun demanded 'total withdrawal' of Palestinians
from Lebanon as a necessity for reaching 'national reconcilia-
102tion.'" Only several significant incidents would once
again be required to change the sporadic violence into major
civil war.
The first of these instigating incidents occurred on
March 11, 1978, when 13 Palestinian terrorists crossed over
into Israel from Lebanon and hijacked a bus on the road to
Tel Aviv. In the ensuing battle with Israeli police, the
bus exploded in flames, resulting in the death of all
occupants. Members of the Palestinian commando group
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Fateh claimed responsibility. 103 Israel's retaliation was
swift and considerable. On March, 15, a major offensive
was mounted by Israeli air, infantry and artillery forces,
striking at Palestinian guerrilla camps in southern Lebanon
and establishing a 6 mile buffer zone along the Lebanon-
104Israeli border. Fighting continued for several days as
Israeli forces, aided by Christian militias (primarily
that of Major Haddad) took control of most of the Lebanese
territory south of the Litani River. Approximately 200,000
Lebanese villagers and 65,000 Palestinian refugees were
105forced to leave the south during the fighting, moving
into the already overcrowded slum suburbs of Beirut. As a
result of a U.N. Security Council meeting in late March, a
U.N. peacekeeping force was created, and units of this force
(called the U.N. Interim Forces in Lebanon - UNIFIL) began
deploying in the south on March 25. Throughout April and
May the situation remained tense, with UNIFIL troops fre-
quently becoming caught in crossfires between Israeli and
Palestinian units. On June 13 the last of the Israeli units
left Lebanon, and relative peace was restored by UNIFIL.
103According to its original plan, the group was to have
captured a Tel Aviv hotel and then bargained its hostages
for the release of several Palestinians being held by the
Israelis for past terrorist acts. See New York Times ,
13 March 1978.
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In their departure, however, the Israelis had left certain
strategic enclaves in the hands of Haddad's Christian militias
rather than UNIFIL.
On the very same day as the final Israeli withdrawal
in the south, the son of former president Franjiyyeh and
thirty other supporters were ambushed in their home in
Ehden, in the north. Members of Gemayel's Phalangists were
107implicated in the slayings. Gemayel and Franjiyyeh had
been at odds concerning the presence of the Syrian ADF in
Lebanon, which Franjiyyeh alone of all the Maronite leaders
supported. Syrian President Assad, a friend of Franjiyyeh,
sought retribution at the hands of his ADF force. On July 1,
1978, after preliminary incidents of Christian violence in
the north, heavy fighting (.artillery and rocket exchanges)
broke out in Beirut between Syrian ADF and Christian forces,
continuing daily for the remainder of the month. In the south,
Fateh units battled rejectionist PLF Palestinian forces -
Fateh attempting to protect UNIFIL positions from the PLF,
while Lebanese Army units were stopped from deploying to the
south by the shelling of Christian militia units in early
August
.
Syrian ADF forces attempted unsuccessfully to pull out
of Christian sections of Beirut under a ceasefire in mid-
August. Fighting broke out again, however, and continued
with increasing intensity throughout September, as Phalangist
1Q 7Arab Report and Record , No. 12, 16-30 June 1978
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and NLP headquarters in turn became the targets of ADF
artillery shelling, mortar and rocket fire. By early October
major portions of the Christian sector of east Beirut were
devastated.
In October, international efforts by the U.S., France and
the U.N. , calling for a ceasefire amidst continued ADF-
Christian exchanges, were finally instigated. The U.S.,
busy with the Camp David negotiations, promoted initiatives
by France which called for a ceasefire followed by a Christian-
Moslem Lebanese dialogue and replacement of Syrian ADF troops
in Beirut by Lebanese Army units (a plan approved of by
President Sarkis). Following these proposals a meeting of
Foreign Ministers of those countries which supplied troops
or financing for the ADF CSaufi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Sudan) was held in
the Lebanese town of Beiteddin on 15 October. As a result
of this meeting, an agreement was reached calling for:
1) the reaffirmation of Lebanese unity and independence.
2) collection of all illegally held weapons.
3) full implementation of the Cairo and Riyadh agreements.
4) a timetable for the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army.
5) the achievement of national reconciliation among all
Lebanese parties.
6) the establishment of a follow-up committee to oversee
108
the accomplishment of these conditions.
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Despite the all encompassing measures called for in the
Beiteddin Agreement, the inconclusiveness of the Arab talks
was quickly demonstrated by a resurgence of Christian-ADF
fighting in November.
Obviously the disarming of the militias was a hopelessly
optimistic dream. On November 21 a bus containing ADF troops
was the victim of a bomb attack, while the Saudi Ambassador
was wounded when caught in a Christian-ADF crossfire while on
a helicopter inspection trip. Fighting between ADF and
Christian units continued into Janaury 1979 as "the nominal
ceasefire between the Christian militias and Syrian troops
in Beirut which had been initiated in October 1978 was
frequently violated by sniping incidents and occasional
outbreaks of fierce fighting, while violence between Moslems
109
and Christians occurred sporadically."
In the aftermath of the Beiteddin Agreement, just as
had occurred after the Riyadh Agreement in 1976, none of the
real civil war issues had been resolved. And the fighting,
although dropping off in intensity in December 1978 and
January 1979, still flared up again on occasion. Another
50,000 Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian casualties had been
suffered in the 1978 fighting. Still, armed clashes in
the authorityless areas of the country might involve Christian
versus Palestinian, Christian versus ADF, intra-Palestinian
Keesing' s Contemporary Archives
,
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or intra-Christian fighting. In Beirut, in the north and
in the south, the situation in the troubled country remained
at best a fragile truce. It would be in the south, however,
where the difficulties of the continuing Lebanese crisis
would continue to surface.
89

VI. THE CURRENT IMPASSE
Anyone supposing that, given the right mixture of petro-
dollars and political acumen, Lebanon could rise like
a phoenix from the ashes of the civil war is surely
mistaken. So great has been the catastrophe that it has
severed all meaningful continuity with the past. Only
the problems remain; but magnified many times over. 111
After the 1978 war, the Lebanese impasse has come to
be more and more centered on the south Lebanon issue. With
a precedent now set and any doubts of Israeli security
interests there verified by their invasion in March 1978;
with the Palestinians determined to maintain their presence
there; with the Lebanese army thus far unable to deploy
and exert the state's authority there; with the leftists
charged with the responsibility of providing the minimal
services to the inhabitants there; and with UNIFIL facing
the luckless task of attempting to curtail violence there;
any change in the situation will obviously depend on the
interaction of many actors. And a solution to the impasse
will certainly depend upon such change. For Lebanon, faced
with the fact that a resolution to the impasse in the south,
and thus its future, is dependent upon forces and actors
which are beyond its ability to control, the situation is
quite disconcerting.
A. THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH
Since the civil war truce resulting from the Beiteddin
Agreement of fall 1978, the situation in south Lebanon has
unfortunately deteriorated. The task of UNIFIL to keep
li:LSeale, "Lebanon", p. 251.
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antagonistic factions separated while keeping itself from
becoming targets remains a difficult one. Also, as a result
of Palestinian raids into Israel in response to the signing
of the Camp David Accords in December 1978, the Israelis
have apparently modified their military policy in southern
Lebanon to include more than simply retaliatory but also
preemptive strikes against Palestinian positions (plus anything
else that happens to get in the way). As reported in Internews
Israeli retaliation against Palestinian and Lebanese
leftist targets in southern Lebanon has been swift
and extensive. The most serious Israeli attack since
the treaty was signed was a four-day operation launched
April 23. Israeli gunboats, jet bombers and artillery
pounded PLO bases, rural villages and shanty towns
around the port of Tyre. ^12
Israeli air and artillery strikes against Palestinian positions
in southern Lebanon subsequent to this raid have become more
frequent and devastating - causing Lebanese civilian as well
as Palestinian casualties. Syrian challenges of Israeli
air superiority over the south have resulted in 4 Syrian
Mig 21s shot down by Israeli F-15s in June 1979 and 5
others in September. Lebanese appeals to the U.N. Security
Council have had little effect on the situation. These
recent Israeli actions have also displaced yet another wave
of refugees from the south toward Beirut's already over
crowded suburbs. According to The Middle East:
lip




Nearly 200,000 Lebanese and Palestinians have been
forced to leave their homes and property in south Lebanon
over the last six months, Many villages have been
destroyed and some of the big cities look like ghost
towns. 113
Most recently, however, in a move obviously dictated by
the PLO's Yasir Arafat, a policy of distinct curtailment of
Palestinian commando raids on Israel has been in effect
since the fall of 1979 - signalling a new PLO strategy.
The inability of Lebanon to exert its authority and
sovereignty over the south can be attributed directly to
the ineffectiveness and inferiority of the Lebanese army,
still under reconstruction after the 1976 civil war. With
respect to the private militias of the Lebanese factions -
particularly the Christians - it is inferior both in numbers
and armament. In its initial attempt to deploy to the south
in June 1978, the army "was stymied in the village of
Kawkaba by the Israeli-sponsored Christian militias and
rebel military units of the south, through which territory
114it was supposed to cross." Lebanon is still trying to
build up this force (maintaining a sectarian balance), but
it is as yet far short of its desired level of 30-35,000.
According to The Arab World Weekly :
The Lebanese Army is now 17, 000-strong, according to
military sources who said that, however, only 10,000
of these were actually sent on security missions, such
113
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as deploying in Ain Remmaneh or in the south. These




The revitalized Lebanese Army is also not as well equipped
as some of the private militias and the Palestinians, since
much of the heavier army weapons - artillery and mortars -
fell into the hands of these militias after the army's split
in 1976 and have not yet been replaced. The U.S. and France
have agreed to reequip the new Lebanese Army, but it is
clear that as long as the private militias outnumber the
revitalized Lebanese Army and show no inclination of either
disarming or falling in line with governmental desires,
Lebanon's problems will persist. This is also a major factor
in Syria's continued ADF presence, as Yorke explains:
Unless the embryonic Lebanese Army is reorganized, the
government could not enforce disarmament, and Syria
would not countenance disarming her PLO allies with
the accompanying risk of political repercussions
in Damascus. Syria also knows that this would increase
pressure to allow the PLO an alternate military
sanctuary in Syria. H°
Lebanese desires, backed up by recent U.N. resolutions,
are for a combined Lebanese Army and UNIFIL deployment to
the south. General Erskine CUNIFIL Commander), however,
though not opposed to this expanded role of his small
6,500 man force, has placed several preconditions on such
a move. Along with the control of the port of Tyre and
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the bridge across the Litani River on the Beirut -Tyre road,
"the toughest condition General Erskine laid down is that
UNIFIL could not move if there were still groups of armed
elements not only in Tyre but in Rashidiyyeh, Bourjal-
Shamali and other CPalestinian camps)." 117 Although in recent
agreements with Yasir Arafat, Lebanese President Sarkis
has received assurances of a stop to PLO activities against
Israel, it is unlikely that the Palestinians are willing to
give up their armed presence. Also, some of the more
troublesome Palestinian groups, the PFLP for one, do not
recognize PLO leadership and direction. It is difficult to
predict how Major Haddad's forces would react to such a
joint U.N. -Lebanese move into their enclave as well.
Most recently, in February 1980, the situation in the
south again has erupted into violence. In response to a sudden
Syrian announcement of a withdrawal of the ADF from Beirut,
fighting broke out in the south between Christian militias
and Palestinian commando units. This was followed immediately
by a statement made by Israeli Prime Minister Begin reconfirming
118
Israeli support for the Christian Lebanese. Although the
Syrian move was subsequently clarified as only a redistribution
of forces for training and security purposes, this example
points out the continued volatile nature of the Lebanese
situation. Regardless of the reason for this renewed fighting
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in the south, it could very well have detrimental effects on
the concurrent Palestinian autonomy talks being negotiated
in conjunction with the Camp David Agreement and also on the
current PLO political initiatives. Although there are also
reports that Lebanese Army units Cintegrated with UNIFIL
units) are moving into the south, their ability to prevent
these Christian-Palestinian clashes seems evident. Further
reports of transfers of tanks by the Soviets to the Palestinians
in the south are also foreboding - indicating that the current
clashes could escalate with little provocation.
B. INTER-ARAB INITIATIVES
Realizing the difficulty and the deteriorating trend of
the situation in Lebanon, President Sarkis made a dramatic
and desperate move in October 1979, calling for a special
Arab League summit to deal specifically with the southern
Lebanon stalemate, and threatening to cast his lot with
Egypt, Israel and the U.S. by joining the Camp David peace
initiatives if refused. The subsequently called Arab League
meeting, scheduled for November 1979, would include presen-
tation of the Palestinian and Lebanese positions along with
proposals drafted by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for a solu-
tion to the south Lebanon-Palestinian problem. Thus Sarkis
had thrust the Lebanon and Palestinian issues to the fore-
front of Middle East regional affairs and spurred the
reluctant Arab countries to action on this issue by raising





With, a solution to the Palestinian problem generally
regarded as a prerequisite to meaningful progress on the
greater Lebanese crisis, the south Lebanon situation would
seem now to take precedence over the still unresolved
civil war issues and internal Lebanese disputes. With the
inability of the Lebanese government to influence the
external actors involved in the south, it is understandable
why Lebanon has attempted with, some degree of urgency to
bring these matters into the international forefront.
Lebanon rightly foresees its very existence as an independent
state in jeopardy with little control over the situation.
It is clear the Lebanese leaders would prefer to see an inter-
Arab solution to its plight come about, but failing this
it hopes to appeal to the U.S. by its willingness to join
the Camp David Accords. As explained in The Arab World
Weekly :
The Lebanese position has been made clear more than
once and is based on the fact that Lebanon cannot
go on bearing the entire burden of the Arab-Israeli
confrontation alone. It has called on the Arabs to
arrive at a joint decision either to go to war and
defend the South, or help stop the attacks on the South
by other means - mainly by pressuring the Palestinians
to stop their operations from the South and to withdraw
from that region. . . . In other terms, as some
observers put it, Lebanon is placing the Arabs in
front of a choice: either they will take a joint
decision on what to do in the South, or Lebanon -
forced to choose between two evils - may decide to
yield to the pressures exerted by Israel and the U.S.
and agree to join the peace negotiations on the basis
of the Camp David framework agreements. 119
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At the same time, the inability of the Lebanese Army
to deploy and exert the nation's authority in the country
makes Lebanon further dependent on the Syrian ADF and more
importantly in the south on the UNIFIL forces to preserve
its sovereignty.
For Lebanon, the presence of UNIFIL in the south is
indispensable, for it is the only element which
"guarantees" that south Lebanon is still Lebanese
and the forces' departure would lead to the dismantling
of the south and perhaps of Lebanon as a whole. For
this reason, officials have itensified efforts aiming
at ensuring that the international forces will not
withdraw despite their discouragement with the
situation they are in. 120
Lebanon's position, then, is tenable only with the continued
grace of outside forces - a most disconcerting feeling.
President Sarkis and the Lebanese leaders had placed
great hopes on the results of the Arab League Summit to deal
with the southern Lebanon problem. In a previous Foreign
Ministers meeting held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia preliminary
to the actual summit in Tunis, Tunisia, two peace plans
were revealed for debate at the summit.
The Saudi plan contained four basic provisions. These
included:
1) A trilateral truce among the PLO, Israel and the Lebanese
state.
2) Israel would stop backing Major Haddad's renegade
Lebanese army faction in the south and stop shelling
Palestinian positions there.
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3) PLO would freeze guerrilla operations against Israel
and end their armed presence outside their camps.
4) The Lebanese Army and UNIFIL would take control of the
south.
These provisions were intended to bring about the following
A) A revision of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242
recognizing Palestinian rights.
B) PLO recognition of Resolution 242 and therefore Israel's
right to exist.
C) A dialogue between the U.S. and the PLO.
D) Formation of a Palestinian government in exile.
E) A link between this Palestinian government and Jordan.
121F) Finally, peace negotiations with Israel.
Interestingly enough, this Saudi plan mentioned Jordan,
which has a fairly large Palestinian population and still
considers the West Bank as its occupied territory, but not
Syria. Also, no real commitment is made to Lebanon other
than to allow it, in conjunction with UNIFIL, to move its
forces into the south. The major impetus in the plan seems
to deal with the Palestinians. This emphasis may be at the
expense of Lebanese and Syrian interests.
The U.S. proposed plan, revealed to President Sarkis
by U.S. Ambassador Dean and to Lebanese Foreign Minister
Boutros by Secretary of State Vance, differed slightly
in its emphasis, though not remarkably in its provisions,
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from the Saudi plan. Its basic provisions call for:
1) Palestinian withdrawal to north of the Litani River and
a freeze in their guerrilla operations against Israel.
2) Israel would stop backing Major Haddad's forces in the
south.
3) The Lebanese Army with UNIFIL would extend its authority
into the south.
These provisions were intended to bring about the following:
A) Jordan would join the Camp David peace initiatives. It
is felt by the U.S. that Jordanian-Palestinian relations
would have to follow rather than precede this move.
B) A Revision of U.N. Resolution 242 to recognize Palestinian
rights.
C) PLO recognition of Resolution 242 and a PLO-U.S. dialogue.
D) A national accord among the Lebanese parties and a
122gradual withdrawal of the Syrian ADF from Lebanon.
Although its provisions were not as extensive, it can be
seen that the expected outcome of the U.S. plan expressed more
all-encompassing goals than did the Saudi plan. This may
be the case due to the tendency of the U.S. to seek complete
and long-term solutions to international problems within
narrow time frames. Or it might simply indirectly reflect a
proposed solution to the problem more in consonance with
U.S. interests. It has always been somewhat uncertain whether
Arab interests in Lebanon (.other than Syrian) are concerned
1 22
The Arab Press Service Recorder, p. 10.
99

with helping the Lebanese state solve its internal conflicts
or simply with defusing the potentially dangerous situation
in the south. The U.S. could be accused of this self-interest
as well. The provisions of both the U.S. and Saudi plans,
however, did delineate important initial steps in solving the
problem in the south. Carrying them out is obviously another
matter.
The results of the Arab League Summit on November 20-
22, 1979 were both disappointing and ominous for Lebanon.
Although the south Lebanon issue was discussed (.along with
combined Arab League policy with regard to Egypt and Iran)
and a general statement in support of Lebanese sovereignty
was issued, the general attitude of the league with respect
to the Lebanese crisis can be summed up in the Kuwaiti
Foreign Minister's statement, "There is nothing we can do.
We have done what we can, and it is now up to the Lebanese
123themselves to get together and solve their problem."
Not only was this a blow to the Lebanese hopes but to the
Palestinians as well. This has led to the formation of a
new "strategic alliance" between Syrian and the Palestinians,
who seem to be the only League members with recognizable
and mutual interests in the Lebanese impasse. As for the
Lebanese leaders' hopes for the summit:
The lesson which Lebanon may have learned as a result
of the Tunis conference is that the search for a
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settlement of its problem in the south through Arab
channels is hopeless. The question is whether the
Lebanese leadership will now seek help from outside
the Arab framework. 124
With the Arab League's desertion of the Lebanese cause, it is
clear that the opportunity for a U.S. initiative in this
area has now presented itself.
C. U.S. INITIATIVES AND INTERESTS
Ideally, as a first step, the U.S. would like to get all
parties involved - including Lebanese officials, the Israelis,
the Palestinians, the Syrians and representatives of the
Lebanese Christian and Moslem groups - to hold talks
mediated by the U.S. to attempt to resolve the problem.
Obviously any U.S. mediator would be taking his life in his
hands by sitting all these antagonists together in one
room; therefore, according to the U.S. plan, "two separate
conferences would be held in which the parties directly in-
125
volved would negotiate through U.N. intermediaries."
Although the Arabs would tend to see this U.S. initiative
as simply a means of getting the Palestinians and Syria into
the Middle East peace plan, it seems that even the Palestinians
(PLO) are now counting on the U.S. to help their cause. As
The Middle East explains:
The PLO has clearly accepted the argument, long put
forward by Palestinian-Americans, that the key to the
124





solution of the Middle East problem lies in Washington.
Equally clearly, it sees Europe as the quickest route
to the White House. 12,b
This explains PLO leader Arafat's recent visits with various
European leaders. The only remaining issue is what the U.S.
has at stake in providing the impetus behind initiatives to
settlement of the south Lebanon problem.
The main difficulty in the U.S. attempts to mediate the
problem stems from the basic incompatibility between the
Arab and Israeli formulas for the establishment of a lasting
Middle East peace. Also complicating the situation are the
U.S. commitment to the security of Israel and its at best
pseudo-recognition of the PLO as the legal Palestinian rep-
resentative body - which bring into question its credibility
as an impartial mediator. However, in his State of the Union
Address in January 1980, President Carter not only recon-
firmed the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel but also
mentioned the granting of Palestinian self-determination.
Many feel this speech signalled a shift in U.S. policy toward
the Palestinians.
Israel's true desire for peace in the area is itself
open to question, considering its continued military policy
in south Lebanon. Acceptance of the Camp David Accords,
however, is a good indication of the Israeli-U.S. peace
strategy - which basically calls for separate peace
agreements (following the lead of Egypt) to be signed by
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Israel with her other bordering Arab states (Jordan, Lebanon
and Syria), thus finally legitimizing Israel's existence
as a Middle Eastern nation. Yet it is apparent that such a
peace process can never be fulfilled while the Palestinians
(which Israel is trying to ignore) are left out of the formula.
This is where south. Lebanon, often referred to as Palestinian
"Fatehland" comes into the picture. As Whittingham explains:
Thus on the Lebanese—Israeli border, both Palestinians
and Lebanese, working separately but in close coordina-
tion, maintain a constant defense line. The region is
not yet the depopulated zone dreamed of by the Israelis;
many villagers have refused to leave their homes, only
too conscious of the fact that just a few miles farther
south people who have left in 1948 have never been able
to return. 127
With Israeli eyes supposedly on the Litani River water, the
southern Lebanese villagers and the Palestinians there feel
that south Lebanon could become the next prize of Israeli
expansionism - similar to the Golan Heights. Whether this
Israeli plan is in fact true or not, it appears Israel would
prefer the area be depopulated Cat least vacated by the
Palestinians) or controlled by Haddad's forces. As Whittingham
states
:
If the Israelis succeed in depopulating the area south
of the Litani River, they then can claim the existence
of a no-mans land - a convenient buffer zone of the
kind they have south in the Golan Heights and Sinai.
Such a buffer zone in Lebanon is particularly significant
since much of Israel's industrial plant is situated
Ken Whittingham, "South Lebanon - Prelude to Occupation",
South Lebanon
,
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in the north around Haifa, and is vulnerable to
attack from Lebanon in case of war.
. . Speculation
as to the aims of Israeli strategy in south Lebanon
is supported by what Israeli forces have actually
done on the ground. 128
The only possible way the Palestinians would be willing to
give up this remaining bastion of its armed presence, on
the other hand, would be the creation of a Palestinian state
on the West Bank and Gaza Can idea which is beginning to
receive more international acceptance and approval). This
brings up the main obstacle to the Israeli-U.S. separate peace
plan iniated by the Camp David Accords.
It is the refusal of Israel to realistically negotiate
on the West Bank issue or to recognize the PLO as the legal
representative of the Palestinian people which the Palestinians
feel necessitates their position in south Lebanon. Yet their
situation in Lebanon has not only decreased their ability to
pose a military threat to Israel, but also has threatened the
establishment of their political base. As Abraham points out:
The real threat confronting the Palestinian resistance
in the stalemated civil war in Lebanon stems most
importantly from the political isolation it would
face were a negotiated settlement between the remaining
confrontation states and Israel concluded to their
exclusion. Political abandonment would necessarily
mean tightening the military noose in Lebanon. 129
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Sooner or later, the U.S. -Israeli position must come to
realize that the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, must
have a place in any future negotiated settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. In this regard, the recent curtailment
of commando activity by the PLO should be considered as a
signal not to be overlooked by the U.S. in their peace efforts
For as Abraham further states:
Rather than facilitate the PLO's moderation, the Camp
David Accords have confronted the PLO with a new set
of challenges. Today the PLO stands at the crossroads
between continuing its moderation or developing an
alternate strategy. 130
With the strong "rejectionist wing of the PLO still calling
for no recognition or coexistence with Israel and continuing
to support armed struggle, the south Lebanon situation remains
inextricably linked to the Middle East peace and Palestinian
issues. The fact that these problems are now beginning to
be recognized by the U.S. in its position as peace mediator
is best expressed in U.N. Ambassador Donald McHenry ' s re-
cent statement
:
We are faced now with certain hard realities - whether
we like it or not. The first of these is that there
cannot be a just and durable solution of the Middle
East conflict without the active participation of the
Palestinians. The second hard reality is that so far
no prominent Palestinian has indicated readiness to
participate in the negotiations in view of the position
adopted by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
and the Baghdad Summits. The greatest difficulty now
facing U.S. peace efforts is convincing both Israel and
the PLO that negotiations and recognition are in their
mutual best interest as well as the overall interest of
Middle East peace. 131
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The Arab formula for peace in the area (supported as
well by the Soviets) is to reconvene the Geneva Conference
to affect an overall peace settlement within the context of
a revised Resolution 242 to include the Palestinian right
to self determination. As shown by the Baghdad Summit and
subsequent resolutions, the Arab nations oppose the separate
peace agreement formula accepted by Egypt . They instead
feel that a comprehensive peace plan would be to their
advantage for reasons of Arab unity. As McHenry explains:
The basic Arab argument against the Camp David agreements
is that Israel's purpose is not attainment of a
comprehensive peace but the destruction of Arab unity.
The Arabs see Egypt as having been pulled out of a
united Arab strategy, of having entered into a
"separate deal." 1 *3^
It is recognized by the Arabs that, at least in military
terms, only a united Arab stand can hope to stand up to
Israeli strength. And in this respect, Egypt's defection
from the united Arab ranks is viewed with great concern.
U.S. lack of support for a comprehensive Geneva type
peace settlement plan stems not only from its commitment
to the Camp David plan but also from its continued commit-
ment to Israeli security. The U.S. cannot effectively
countermand Israeli objections to such a plan without
abandoning (or being accused by Israel of abandoning) this
commitment. As for Israel's view of the Arab plan, according
to McHenry:
132McHenry, "Israelis and Palestinians", pp. 51, 52
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Many Israelis fear that Arab strategy envisages the
present phase as a way-station to absorbing Israel
into the dream of a "secular-democratic" Palestine.
There is also profound concern that the contiguity of
the West Bank and Gaza to the population centers of
Israel creates unique problems for Israel's security.
The basic anxiety is that the Arab nations will only
pretend to accept Israel's existence and sovereignty . 133
It is obvious that U.S. attempts to reconcile these
opposing viewpoints held by the Israelis and the Palestinians
(with their Arab supporters) presents no easy tasks. With
U.S. interests in the Middle East region now focused on the
Persian Gulf area in general and Iran and Afghanistan in
particular, it appears that southern Lebanon and the
Palestinians have been given a rather low priority in U.S.
regional diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately for Lebanon, this
lack of international concern with its plight has been one
of its more recurring and discouraging problems. So, while
an end to the southern Lebanon problem awaits disposition of
the Palestinian issue, Lebanon remains a state in internal
turmoil and potential crisis.
C. THE CRISIS OF CONFESSIONALISM
Once the south Lebanon situation, with its international
complications, is set aside, a critical question for Lebanon
remains whether or not a reconciliation or solution to the
differences among all the internal factions in the country
can ever be brought about. Even if the Palestinian commando
presence and the Syrian ADF were to be withdrawn from Lebanon,
133McHenry, "Israelis and Palestinians", p. 52.
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different opinions on the future of the state structure would
most likely become more prominent rather than diminish. Re-
newed violence would almost surely follow. Upon reviewing
all the factors involved, it may be safely stated that these
differences are in essence political, cultural and economic
in character rather than ideological or religious. This
situation remains the heart of Lebanon's crisis, and it is a
problem yet to be addressed in the present atmosphere of
instability and chaos in the country.
In political terms, the most striking aspect of the
Lebanese problem is a lack of legitimacy of the existing
government. It is generally accepted that the confessional
formula of the government which assures Maronite ascendancy
has become anachronistic and that a new political formula
is necessary. However, as the strong Maronite families
(Chamoun, Gemayel , Franjiyyeh) continue to struggle for power
in the lack of law and order atmosphere in the country while
the leftist coalition continues to challenge the continuance
of Maronite ascendancy, the hopes for peaceful political re-
forms remains dim. As an initial step, then, a restoration
of law and order in the country must precede any initial
steps toward national reconciliation. This is where the
revitalized army must play its part, as Salem notes:
The army is the key to new Lebanon. If this institution
can be built along national trans-confessional lines,
then, one might hypothesize, other state institutions
could also be rebuilt. 134
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The initial moves of the deployment of the Lebanese Army into
the south must be viewed as an encouraging sign. Yet, the
army is still structured with a predominance of Christians
(Maronites) in the officer corp and a predominance of Moslems
in the enlisted ranks, and this could easily limit its effec-
tiveness in dealing with further sectarian strife in the
country. The army is also not prepared (nor is Syria partic-
ularly anxious for it) to replace the ADF in the areas of
the country other than the south as a security force.
The political options for Lebanon are essentially four-
fold. The most likely option, at least for the immediate
future, is the continuation of the present political impasse.
The inherent instability and potential for violence would
seem to make this option unviable in the long-term, yet the
lack of political consensus as to the direction in which the
country should proceed tends to perpetuate the problem. In-
terference of the outside actors has done its part in this
perpetuation as well. The dangerous aspect of this option
is that the longer this political ineffectiveness and in-
stability last, the more the future viability and integrity
of the Lebanese state is threatened. The power and intran-
sigence of the major factions in the country, with their
militias, is the greatest stumbling block here. As Koury
explains
:
Moreover, as long as either side believes it can win
it is unlikely to seek a political solution. Only
military stalemate seems likely to open the way toward
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a political resolution. In general, military stalemate
either could come from the exhaustion of both sides or
could be imposed from outside. In either case political
negotiation would begin when the stalemate had come about. 135
The second option for Lebanon is partition into Christian,
Moslem and possibly even Palestinian ministates. In some
respects, with the lack of centralized governmental authority,
the situation in the country could be considered as somewhat
of a de facto partition - although no formal lines have been
drawn. The Lebanese Christian elements are said to favor this
solution over one which would limit their ascendancy in power
in a revised Lebanese political formula. The Moslem leftist
element, however, is opposed to the sanctioning of what would
no doubt become an Israeli backed Christian ministate. The
Syrians, their political stake in Lebanon illustrated by the
ADF presence, are opposed to partition as well. One of the
reasons given for their intervention in the Lebanese civil war
in 1976 was to prevent such an eventuality. For the Syrians,
an Israeli backed Christian ministate in Lebanon would only
provide further territory for Israeli aggression against Syria -
creating a second Golan Heights front. Koury provides the best
explanation for the futility of the partition option as he
states: "Partition would eliminate tension in Lebanon by
eliminating Lebanon, but it would not eliminate tension in
the area." With the current Maronite attitude that they
1 *35





would rather sacrifice the integrity of Lebanon than give
up their militias in the current situation, however, the
threat of partition remains a somewhat real one.
The two remaining options for Lebanon are basically
political compromise solutions - secularization of the
state or the establishment of a federation of confessional
states within the country. The first of these proposed
solutions is the program of the Lebanese National Movement
while the other is offered by political scientists studying
the Lebanon problem. Both these programs would require
some outside impetus to institute and would further require
some degree of reconciliation among the various factions in
the country. Thus, they would necessitate an ease in sec-
tarian tensions and acceptance of an outside body or agency
to mediate the agreement on an accepted political compromise
solution. The secularization option, of course, would be
designed to equalize Christian and Moslem political power
and representation in Lebanon, although ideally it is de-
signed to eliminate religious bases of government structure.
The federation formula, on the other hand, would leave
sectarian divisions intact on a regional level while forming
an equally represented federal governing body. This solution
represents perhaps the only compromise which would be
acceptable to the Christian community. As Koury states; "Some
rightists assert that Lebanon's future lies in a loose
federation - that is, partition first and the loose federation
137
to hold the two communal parts together afterwards."
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If partition were to be a precursor to the establishment of
a federation, however, the possibility of this option being
instituted is rather slim - since many feel that partition
(which could never be ethnographically equally instituted
without forced migrations) would only lead to continuation of
Lebanon's sectarian strife on several smaller scales. A
political solution to the Lebanon crisis, therefore, is a com-
plex and ambitious endeavor and, in addition, is nowhere in
sight
.
The cultural basis of division in the country stems from
the legacy of French colonialism in Lebanon, which has pro-
duced a Western cultural bias among the Christian community.
This community finds it difficult to accept the basic Arab
character of Lebanon represented by its Moslem population seg-
ment and its historical and geographic background. These
cultural differences have been perpetuated by the determination
of the Maronite Christian community to maintain its separate
and distinct identity. This attitude has been institutionalized
by inequities in social and educational programs as well as
in other areas of the services sector. The educational sector,
however, is where these differences are both most apparent and
tend to most visibly perpetuate the sectarian differences. As
Salem points out:
The national educational system, at the elementary
and secondary levels, ideologically weak and uncertain,
did not build citizens, and the private educational
system, which accommodated more than half of the
Lebanese preuniversity system, was confessional through
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and through. The Sunni school system prepared a
citizen different from the one prepared by the Maronite
school system. 138
With some of Lebanon's future citizens being taught a
French Western cultural identification while others are
taught an Arab cultural identification, and while these
differences are sporadically heightened by sectarian violence,
the prospects for reconciliation or mutual cultural under-
standing or assimilation are far from promising.
Economic differences in the country comprise perhaps
the most hidden yet significant of the factors dividing the
two major communities in Lebanon. There is a substantial and
growing gap between the rich and poor segments of the popula-
tion, which generally correlates to the two major sectarian
divisions as well. With the approximately 400,000 Palestinians
joined by at least that number of Lebanese refugees displaced
by the civil war fighting crowded into the slum suburbs
around Beirut, there is little doubt which of the communities
represents the poor and dispossessed. The fact that these
slum quarters are located on the outskirts of the more affluent
Christian quarter of Beirut only adds to the feelings of
relative deprivation common among the Sunni Palestinians and
Shia Lebanese peasants.
Additionally, a majority of the rural Lebanese small
farmers are Moslem. This portion of the agricultural sector
138Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace
in a Turbulent Land", p. 449.
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is a low priority in government economic planning and develop-
ment policy, causing further discontent. These farmers rep-
resent a substantial portion of the mostly Moslem agricultural
segment of the population, as Nasr explains:
Seventy-six percent of the persons working the land
had landholdings of less than three hectares and
50 percent had less than one hectare. Fifty-seven
percent of the active agricultural population were
"independent" or "family help." 139
With many of these small farms operating adjacent to
Christian-owned capital-intensive large agribusiness
enterprises, the problems of preceived inequities is only
exacerbated. Unfortunately, the capitalist growth and relative
prosperity of Lebanon has also given rise to these socio-
economic inequities which tend to magnify sectarian
differences. These poor and dispossessed, whether rural or
urban, who see little prospect of improvement of their
economic plight are naturally ripe for recruitment into the
leftist militias.
Finally, the continued civil war atmosphere in Lebanon
has discouraged government initiatives toward the rebuilding
of portions of the infrastructure and public and private
structures and property which were damaged or destroyed by
the fighting. Although some international relief and Arab
League reconstruction aid funds have been provided,
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the government was initially reluctant to begin this effort
while the political fate of the country remains uncertain.
More recently, however:
The authorities have discarded their earlier belief
that a political solution must take precedence: there
is a real fear that, unless reconstruction begins
immediately the country may never recover its economic
strength. 139
Accordingly, a major portion of the $3 billion Lebanese
reconstruction program has been dedicated to the large
segment of the population in need of humanitarian aid -
with unemployment relief and low cost housing the biggest
priorities. With capital continuing to flow out of the
country due to the uncretain political situation and
continued Maronite legislative control, such as it is, the
question of whether these well intended plans will come to
fruition remains to be seen. And with a continued threat
of civil war or intra-community violence in Lebanon the
hard reality, it is not likely that the Lebanese government
will be able to solicit the aid to finance one half of its
$3 billion reconstruction plan. In the interim, a large
portion of the potentially productive work force of the
country continues to be tied up with the militias of the
various factions. At the same time, it is felt that a
majority of the international banks which closed Beirut
branches since 1976 will choose not to return, representing
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further lost capital in the Lebanese economy. In the end,
only political stability and an end to civil war violence
in Lebanon can bring a normalization of the economy of the
country - along with its reconstruction.
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VII. CONCLUSION - THE LINKAGES
It has been established at this point that a solution
to the Palestinian problem must be a prerequisite to a solu-
tion to the Lebanese crisis. At the same time, it is becoming
more and more apparent that a solution to the Palestinian
problem must precede the negotiation of a lasting and mean-
ingful Middle East peace, By association, then, this inter-
relationship can be correlated to reveal a unique linkage
between the Lebanese crisis and the prospects for a workable
Middle East peace formula - whether attained as a result of
the Camp David peace process or otherwise. For it appears
that a resolution of the south Lebanon issue will depend on
the end of the armed Palestinian presence there, and this
armed presence presents a stumbling block in the Middle East
peace process as well. However, the willingness of the
Palestinians to abandon their armed struggle against Israel
is dependent in turn upon a political solution to the Palestinian
desire for self determination and a state of its own. Finally,
the prospects for a reconciliation of the internal factions
in Lebanon and a political solution to the basic civil war
issues cannot reasonably be attempted while the south
Lebanon and Palestinian problems remain unresolved. These
linkage factors are at the heart of the issues on which the
future and fate of Lebanon hinges. And yet, many of them are
beyond the control of the Lebanese authority and are proving




With, all this political upheaval and sporadic violence,
however, life in Lebanon goes on. It could even be said
that the country has displayed a remarkable resiliancy and
will to survive to date. Several continuing trends are
visible which are far from encouraging though. Educated and
well-to-do citizens continue to emigrate from Lebanon while
life continues to be harsh- and offer little hope for the
growing refugee community surrounding Beirut. The fact that
the government is unable to provide basic services to these
people not only heightens the legitimacy crisis in the
country but also provides opportunities for leftist
recruitment and radicalization of this growing population
segment. For the slum-dweller, the preceived unresponsiveness
of the Lebanese government to his needs plus the relative
deprivation he also perceives compared to his Maronite fellow
citizen, superimposed over the conflict societies of Lebanon's
ethic and cultural groups, presents a problem which would
be difficult for any government to deal with. Until strong
government authority, through the army and with the support
of the now strong family groups, can be restored, a recurring
pattern of violence can unfortunately be forecast for Lebanon
for the foreseeable future. And with this recurring violence
comes the associated threat of further interference of the
external actors with a stake in Lebanon's future. The threat,
ultimately, is to Lebanon's continued existence.
To the extent that the continued military clashes in
south Lebanon may be considered as a manifestation of the
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Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Palestinians acting as the
Arab surrogate, there is little hope that a peace settlement
can be reached in the region which neglects this disputed
area. This would necessitate some sort of U.S. involvement
in this area as part of the continuation of the Camp David
peace initiatives once a Palestinian-U.S . dialogue is
formally established. It can be foreseen that both Lebanese
and Palestinian diplomatic initiatives will now proceed in
this direction. U.S. preoccupation with the Iranian crisis
and the Soviet Afghanistan invasion, however, has at the
same time shifted the focus cf U.S. regional interests
toward the Persian Gulf region. Most importantly, Israeli
intransigence, its current policy toward south Lebanon, and
its refusal to discuss the Palestinian issue in a realistic
manner are perhaps the greatest stumbling blocks in bringing
about a solution to the problems in the south. Although
the longer the impasse continues the more difficult it
becomes to attain a negotiated compromise solution, the
prospects at this point are quite disheartening.
In the end, if the continued viability of the state
of Lebanon remains in the hands of outside forces - the
Syrian ADF and UNIFIL - and linked to the strategic
considerations of Syria and its moderate Arab backers, there
is little hope that it can remain viable in its present
territorial and political entity. There must be a new and
continued resolve among all the major factional groups in
the country to assure the state's continued sovereignty.
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Realistically, this must involve some sort of accommodation
between the Christian and Moslem segments of the population
and a new set of rules for the continued Palestinian
presence in the country. Ultimately, it must involve some
modification of the political formula in Lebanon in order
to re-establish popular support for the government, which
is necessary in order for it to exert its authority
sufficiently to protect all its citizens and provide a
credible deterrence to external security threats. If this
process cannot begin until the private militias have
exhausted their military strength in another round of civil
war, which with increased weapons sophistication could be
more devastating and lethal than its predecessors, it might
be too late for Lebanon. It could find itself either divided
and annexed by Israel and Syria or worse yet the battle-
ground for another Arab-Israeli war. For although certain
factors determining Lebanon's future remain beyond its
control, the main factor which can assure its continued
existence - national reconciliation - can only be accomplished
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